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I. Introduction: “Climate risk is investment risk.”  The statement applies to 
asset managers, whether the investment is money or land. 
“Climate risk is investment risk,” announced Larry Fink in a letter to CEOs this 
January.1  Mr. Fink is the Founder, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, the largest 
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1 Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEO’s: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, 
Blackrock (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 
(last visited June 9, 2020) [hereinafter Blackrock Annual Letter to CEOs]. 
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money-management firm in the world with more than $6 trillion in assets under 
management.2  Each year, Mr. Fink sends a letter to CEOs signaling BlackRock’s 
investment priorities.  This year Mr. Fink warned companies that climate change is 
“driving a profound reassessment of risk and asset values.”3  He reminded CEOs that 
he has a duty to manage assets according to the priorities of his clients, most of whom 
seek a sustained yield with multi-generational investment horizon.  Mindful of these 
priorities, and the threat climate change poses to these objectives, Mr. Fink demanded 
more robust climate change disclosures from companies seeking access to BlackRock’s 
very deep pockets.4  Mr. Fink demanded this information because he recognized that 
“business as usual” is not good business in light of the challenges and risks presented 
by climate change.5    
The hotter the world gets, the graver the forecasted consequences.  Observed 
warming trends reinforce the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C to avoid 
catastrophic effects and reduce the severity of unavoidable changes.6  To achieve this 
result, the International Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) identifies a reduction target 
for global net anthropogenic carbon emissions of 45 percent by 2030 and a net zero 
 
2 Larry Fink has been named one of the “World’s Greatest Leaders by Fortune.  See 
https://fortune.com/worlds-greatest-leaders/2018/larry-fink/.  Barrons has named him one of the 
“World’s Best CEOs for 13 consecutive years.  https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-
us/leadership/larry-fink. 
3 Blackrock Annual Letter to CEOs supra note 1. 
4 Id.; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, “BlackRock C.E.O. Larry Fink: Climate Crisis will Reshape 
Finance,” NEW YORK TIMEs (Jan. 14, 2020). 
5 Mr. Fink is not alone.  The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates unanimously adopted 
a resolution in August 2019 urging every level of government and the private sector to “recognize 
their obligation to address climate change” and instructing all lawyers “to advise their clients of the 
risks and opportunities that climate change provides.”  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 111 (ADOPTED AUGUST 12-13, 2019). available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/annual-2019/111-annual-
2019.pdf; John R. Nolon, Feature Land Use Strategies that Mitigate Climate Change 34 Probate 
and Property 34 (Jan. 2020).  
6 See generally IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policy Makers in Global Warming of 1.5°C An IPCC 
Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related 
global greenhouse gas emission pathways in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty [hereinafter  
IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers]. 
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target by 2050 in order to limit warming to a (hopefully) manageable level.7  At this 
late stage in the game, the equation is simple.  Higher greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emission trajectories lead to higher forecasted global warming with graver 
environmental and security consequences.8  In other words, high emissions result in 
high risk. Failing to reduce GHG emissions is a risk management failure.9 
Like Mr. Fink, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) is also an asset 
manager.  The BLM manages more than 255.8 million acres of public land and most 
of the federal government’s mineral state (over 700 million acres).10  Congress 
instructed the BLM to manage these assets for sustained yield with a multi-generational 
investment horizon—priorities very similar to Mr. Fink’s clients.11  Unlike Mr. Fink, 
the BLM’s current management priorities do not recognize that “climate risk is 
investment risk.”   
The BLM has authority over a significant portion of national GHG emissions.  
Emissions from fossil fuels produced on federal land averaged almost 24 percent of 
national CO2 emissions and over 7 percent of methane emissions for the past ten 
years.12  Instead of following the global trend of mitigating the effects of climate 
 
7 Id. at 14. 
8 The National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change (NSMIP), A Security 
Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change 6 (Feb. 2020) [hereinafter NSMIP, A Security Threat 
Assessment of Global Climate Change] (“Higher levels of warming will pose catastrophic, and 
likely irreversible global security risks over the course of the 21st century.”).  
9 Id. at 12 (“If we collectively turn our backs on these threats, we stand on the precipice of some of 
the greatest, multi-dimensional security threats the world has ever seen.”). 
10 Carol Vincent et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data (Congressional Research 
Service 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf; Karin P. Sheldon, Pamela 
Baldwin, Areas of Critical Environmental Concern: FLPMA’s Unfulfilled Conservation Mandate, 
28 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (WINTER 2017). 
11 This argument is more fully developed in Section III.A.  See also Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands 
and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2018) (noting that many externalities are unaccounted for in federal fossil fuel mineral 
development even though “a well-run business would not give away its assets for a fraction of their 
true value nor allow outside actors to impose uncompensated costs on the bottom line”).  This 
argument is more fully developed in Section III.A. 
12 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., FEDERAL LANDS GREENHOUSE GAS AND SEQUESTRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  ESTIMATES FOR 2005 - 2014 at 1, 8 (2018) available at 
https://doi.org/10.3133/sir20185131 [hereinafter USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014].  See 
also U.S. Dept. of Int., BLM, New Mexico State Office, Cumulative BLM New Mexico Greenhouse 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 






change by avoiding, minimizing, and offsetting GHG emissions, the BLM is increasing 
fossil fuel production on federal lands and eliminating requirements that previously 
minimized GHG emissions during the extraction process.13  Everything else held 
constant, more fossil fuel production obviously results in more GHG emissions, unless 
some sort of offsetting program is implemented.  Increasing GHGs in the atmosphere 
exacerbates the effects of climate change, with potentially disastrous effects for BLM-
managed landscapes and for humanity in general.   
The purpose of this article is two-fold.  First, the article argues that the BLM 
has a statutory duty to respond to climate change, which includes the duty to avoid 
exacerbating climate change.  Second, it seeks to move the legal discussion from 
aspiration to action by proposing a legal strategy, using the existing legal framework, 
by which the BLM can achieve net zero emissions from all new mineral development 
activity.  While the article focuses on oil and gas development, the same methodology 
could be applied to coal mining, tar sands, and other sources of GHG emissions.  
Section I (this section) provides an introduction.  Section II discusses climate science 
and the BLM’s authority over nationally significant emissions that contribute to 
exacerbating climate change.  Section III argues that without incorporating climate 
science into its land management decisions, the BLM cannot fulfill its statutory duties 
under the Federal Land Management Policy Act or its legal responsibility to avoid 
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.  
Section IV turns to the National Environmental Policy Act, arguing that its procedural 
requirements also require the BLM to take a “hard look” at the cumulative effects of 
climate change, risks associated with exacerbating climate change through seemingly 
 
Gas Emissions: A Supplemental White Paper, 18 (2019) (summarizing results of national 
inventory). 
13 See, e.g., Statement of Michael Need, Deputy Director, Operations BLM US Department of the 
Interior before the House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 
Resources Oversight on “Examining the Policies and Priorities of the Bureau of Land Management, 
the U.S. Forest Service, and the Power Marketing Administrations (Mar. 12, 2019) (emphasizing 
BLM efforts to promote and permit fossil fuel energy production, including internal department 
directives limiting and constricting environmental review under NEPA as well as Solicitor Order 
directing BLM to “promote the exploration and development of Federal onshore oil and gas and 
solid mineral reserves.”).  See also Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence 
and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16, 093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (rescinding 
Executive Orders and Plans related to responding to climate change and instructing all agencies to 
“suspend, revise, or rescind” agency actions arising from instructions related to addressing climate 
change) [hereinafter E.O. 13783, Energy Independence].   
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de minimis contributions, and forecasted ecological trends caused by climate change.  
Section V argues that the BLM should develop a comprehensive GHG mitigation plan 
for its oil and gas permitting decisions, including the adoption of a net zero requirement 
for all new oil and gas development activity.  Section VI suggests ways to incorporate 
GHG mitigation at each stage of the oil and gas development process using the existing 
legal structure.  Section VII concludes by arguing that a net zero requirement on all 
new oil and gas development activity is reasonable and has precedent.  
Admittedly, even if fully implemented this proposal would only result in a 
fraction of the necessary reductions that must be taken in accordance with the IPCC’s 
latest guidance.  However, even grand journeys are composed of individual steps, and 
it is time for the BLM to take a step in the right direction.    
II. Climate Science and the BLM’s Contribution to Climate Change.  
 The days of debating whether climate change is real have long since passed.  
Even the fossil fuel industry now recognizes that human activity contributes to our 
changing climate.14  The BLM is the largest landowner in the United States and is 
responsible for managing all federally owned onshore minerals.  The BLM has pursued 
this role with zeal, encouraging expansive oil, natural gas, and coal development.  
Though at one time this strategy arguably served the national interest, those interests 
have changed.  With climate change presenting increasingly dire consequences each 
day, the continued push for fossil fuel development does not take into account the long-
term environmental needs of future generations.15  Instead, of benefiting the national 
interest, a permitting process that exacerbates climate change poses an existential threat 
to the national interest.   
 
14 Maria L. Banda, Climate Science in the Courts: A Review of U.S. and International Judicial 
Pronouncements, Environmental Law Institute 2 (April 2020) [hereinafter Banda, Climate Science 
in the Courts] (noting that the existence of climate change and that human activity exacerbates 
climate change are no longer disputed by the federal government or industry litigants). 
15 43 U.S.C. ¶ 1702(c) (defining “multiple use” to require a “combination of balanced and diverse 
resources uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations”). 
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A. Climate change is happening faster than anticipated and 
increasing GHG emissions will only exacerbate the risks of climate 
change. 
The World Economic Forum opened the 2020 Global Risks Report with a 
sobering observation:  Climate change is “striking harder and more rapidly than many 
expected.”16  In 2017, the Climate Science Special Report summarized “thousands of 
studies conducted by tens of thousands of scientists around the world” documenting 
changes in global temperatures,  changes in rainfall patterns, disappearing snow cover, 
increasing incidents of drought, changing storm patterns, and an increase in 
atmospheric water vapor.17 Recently, other scientists have documented a connection 
between the increase in atmospheric water vapor and the frequency of more extreme 
weather events including stronger hurricanes.18  “Evidence for a changing climate 
abounds, from the top of the atmosphere to the depths of the oceans.”19  The 
unanticipated speed of these global changes prompted the IPCC to issue a special report 
in 2019, clarifying the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.20  “Limits to 
adaptive capacity exist at 1.5° C of warming, [and] become more pronounced at higher 
levels of warming.”21   
Concern over exceeding 1.5°C of warming is not limited to investors and 
scientists—national security experts also see risks.  According to a recent report issued 
by the non-partisan National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate 
Change, the medium-long term scenario for warming between 2°C to 4°C presents “a 
 
16 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2020 available at 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020 [hereinafter WEF, Global Risks 
Report 2020] at 33.  
17 U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017: Climate Science Special Report, Volume I 36 
available at https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf 
[hereinafter NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report]; see also Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation 
in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Report in Brief available at 
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads [hereinafter NCA4 Vol 2,  Climate Science Report in 
Brief]  The report in Volume II, first published in 2018 and revised in June 2019, is the most recent 
formal summary of the best available science regarding observed and forecasted changes. 
18 Union of Concerned Scientists, Hurricanes and Climate Change (June 25, 2019) at 
https://ucsusa.org/resources/hurricanes-and-climate-change.  
19 NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 36. 
20 IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9. 
21 Id. at 10, ¶ B.6.3. 
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potentially unmanageable, ‘very high-catastrophic’ global security threat—such that 
this scenario must be avoided unequivocally.”22  The report characterized climate 
change as a “threat multiplier.”23  Changing climate conditions (causing food 
insecurity, water scarcity, loss of rural livelihoods, and extreme weather) accelerate 
existing social tensions (like migration, disease, state fragility, conflict, and increased 
social violence), resulting in intensified national security risks.24 Without mincing 
words, the report characterized the risks of unabated climate change as “very high” and 
“catastrophic.”25  “If allowed to reach levels that scientific models anticipate, climate 
change will wreak havoc on the security of our nation, and indeed all regions of the 
globe.”26  The report also concluded that existing policies to address climate change 
are insufficient to keep warming below 1.5°C, and that current emission trajectories 
will blow past the 2°C mark by mid-century and could reach a disastrous 4°C by the 
end of the century.27   
Scientific consensus agrees that human activities have already caused 
approximately 1.0°C of global warming.28 Impacts on natural and human systems from 
 
22 NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change supra note 8 at 9. 
23 Id. at 18. 
24 See, e.g. id.  at 18-29 (“First, the sudden shifts in regional climate and weather patterns increased 
localized physical shocks, causing new constraints in resources and making natural disasters more 
frequent and intense in communities across the world.  Then, as human systems are disturbed by 
shocks to local environments, second-order effects creating new migration patterns and community 
fragility can create or exacerbate social tensions at the state and regional levels.  This increased 
regional friction may threaten new territorial disputes, conflicts, trade and economic shocks, and 
harmful unilateral actions.”); id. at 16-23 (summarizing regional and intersecting climate security 
threats for each area of the globe in short- and long-term scenarios). 
25Id. at 8 (defining “very high” to mean “severe and systemic risk to human and social security 
systems” and “catastrophic” to mean “disastrous and irreversible risk to human social and security 
systems). 
26 Id. at 12.  
27 Id. at 7 (“Even if all existing climate policies are implemented, we are on track to increase global 
temperatures by as high as 3.2°C . . . by the end of the century. . . . On current emissions trajectories, 
global warming levels could reach 2°C . . . as soon as mid-century and 4°C . . . as soon as the end 
of the century.”). 
28 IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 4, ¶ A.1; see also WORLD 
METEOROLOGICAL ORG., WMO STATEMENT ON THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE IN 2019 at 3 
(2019) available at https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10211 (last visited April 30, 
2020) (“The year 2019 ended with a global average temperature of 1.1°C above estimated pre-
industrial averages, second only to the record set in 2016.”). 
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global warming have already been observed.29  Allowing global warming to exceed 
1.5°C will likely have irreversible impacts on people and species, including the loss of 
entire ecosystems.30  Future climate related risks “depend on the rate, peak, and 
duration of warming.”31  In other words, reaching and sustaining net zero GHG 
emissions earlier, reduces risks.32  Delay in reducing GHG emissions (our current 
trajectory) exacerbates risks.  
A change in the composition of the atmosphere caused this change.33  Excess 
GHGs have compromised the atmosphere’s ability to provide a stable climate that 
functions consistent with historic conditions.  As a result, the functionality of the 
atmosphere has been degraded.  For hundreds of thousands of years—during the 
entirety of human civilization as we know it—the average carbon concentration in the 
atmosphere fluctuated between 180 and 280 parts per million (ppm).34  With the 
industrial revolution, the average concentration began increasing.35  Between 1958 and 
2019, the average annual CO2 concentration skyrocketed from 315 ppm to over 400 
ppm.36  According to the EPA, the concentration of CO2 has increased 46 percent over 
pre-industrial levels, while the concentration of methane has increased 165 percent 
during this period.37  These and other heat trapping gasses, (like nitrous oxide, and 
fluorinated gases) increased average global temperatures—a gradual shift upward that 
 
29 IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 5, ¶ A.3.1 
30 Id. at 5, ¶ A.3.1. 
31 Id. at 5, ¶ A.3.2 
32 Id. at 5, ¶ A.2.2. 
33 U.S. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2018, Executive 
Summary ES-2 (2020) available at https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-
gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2018 [hereinafter US EPA GHG Inventory 2018]. 
34 NCA4 Vol.. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 82. 
35 NOAA Global Monitoring Division, CO2 at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New 
Milestone: Tops 400 ppm (May 10, 2013) available at 
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of exceeding daily mean of 
400 ppm);  
36 NOAA, Global Carbon Dioxide Growth in 2018 Reached 4th Highest on Record (March 22, 2019) 
available at https://www.noaa.gov/news/global-carbon-dioxide-growth-in-2018-reached-4th-
highest-on-record (last visited April 29, 2020). NOAA Global Monitoring Division, CO2 at NOAA’s 
Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New Milestone: Tops 400 ppm (May 10, 2013) available at 
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of exceeding daily mean of 
400 ppm);  
37 Id. 
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occurred consistent with scientific forecasts.38  The observed warming trend leaves no 
tolerance for arguments denying the anthropogenic influence on climate change.  As 
the Fourth National Assessment summarized, “there are no credible alternative human 
or natural explanations supported by the observational evidence.”39 
Limiting global warming requires adhering to a carbon budget that is being 
rapidly depleted.40  The global average temperature will continue to rise until 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (and other GHGs) stabilize—in other words, until 
global GHG concentrations stop increasing.41  The level of risk imposed on the world 
depends on how high the global average temperature rises.42  Science advisors on the 
IPCC attempt to quantify risk scenarios by associating atmospheric concentrations with 
different levels of warming—450 ppm for 2°C of warming and 430 ppm for 1.5°C of 
warming.43  But global warming does not offer a selection of items that can be ordered 
from a catalogue to fit our budgets and tastes.  Since 2007, world leaders have roughly 
targeted 2°C of warming as the “safe” upper limit of a new normal.44  That 
 
38 IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at ¶ A.1.1; see also NCA4 
Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 31 
39 NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 35 (“Current and future 
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigation actions to reduce emissions, will largely determine 
future climate change impacts and risks to society.”). 
40 IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 12 ¶ C.1.3 (“Limiting 
global warming requires . . . staying within a total carbon budget.  By the end of 2017, anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions since the pre-industrial period are estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget 
for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 +/- 320 GtCO2 (medium confidence).  The associated remaining 
budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42 +/- 3 GtCO2 per year (high confidence).”). 
41 IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 12, ¶C.1.3. (“Limiting 
global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic emissions of CO2”); see 
also US EPA GHG Inventory 2018 supra note 34 at ES-1 (noting that in 1992, the United States 
signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with a goal of 
“stabilization of greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”). 
42 IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at ¶ A.3.2. 
43 This statement is obviously oversimplified.  The emissions scenarios evaluated by the IPCC are 
far more complex.  Nevertheless, the concept remains the same.  See, e.g., IPCC, Climate Change 
2014: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policy Makers: Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) [hereinafter 
IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report] at 20-21; see also IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy 
Makers supra note 9 at 12, ¶ C.1.3 (outlining budget scenarios for limiting warming to 1.5°C). 
44 For example, in the 2010 Cancun Agreements to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the signatories agreed that to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference” with 
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characterization of “safe” came with caveats.  Those caveats included lethal heat 
waves, desertification, forest and crop failures, shrinking snow packs, rising sea levels, 
intensified storms, warming oceans, melting permafrost, widespread species 
extinctions, extreme drought, ecological disruption, and potential tipping points—none 
of which sound safe.45  The characterization of “safe” was also a best guess.  No one 
has ever shifted the mean global temperature upward before.  No one can be sure how 
the world’s climate and ecological system would react.  Changing the atmospheric 
composition is an unprotected experiment filled with uncertainties and risks.46     
 
the atmosphere, they must “hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels.” U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Cancun Agreements: 
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/Add.1, Dec. 1/CP.16 p.4 (Mar. 11, 2011).  The more recent 
Paris Agreement showed slightly more caution, committing the parties to hold the increase to “well 
below” 2°C.  See Paris Agreement to U.M. Framework Convention on Climate change, opened for 
signature Apr. 22, 2016, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, art.2 (entered into force Nov. 4, 
2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
45 See generally, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Fields et al eds., 2014).  For similar 
information with fewer words but more opinion and emotion, see Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s 
Terrifying New Math, Rolling Stone (July 19, 2012). 
46 Any data informed decision-making process risks two types of error, Type I error and Type II 
error.  A Type I error occurs when a decision maker chooses a course of action based on a projected 
outcome when the projected outcome is not correct, whereas Type II error occurs when a decision 
maker rejects the possibility of a projected outcome and the projected outcome turns out to be 
correct.  In the context of climate change, a Type I error would arise where the BLM took a course 
of action because of projected climate impacts when those impacts failed to come to fruition.  For 
example, the BLM anticipated reduced water availability due to lower snowpack and increased rains 
compensated for the lighter snowpack.  A Type II error then is when the BLM decides a course of 
action but fails to take account of climate change impacts when making that decision.  For example, 
the BLM relied upon historic data for water availability without considering the forecasted shortage.  
Ryan P. Kelly, et al., Science, Policy, and Data-Driven Decisions in a Data Vacuum, 44 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 7 (2017); Berry J. Brosi & Eric G. Biber, Statistical Inference, Type II error, and decision 
making under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 7 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(2008). 
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“Potential surprises” is how the Fourth National Assessment characterizes 
some of the risks.47  “The more the climate changes, the greater potential for these 
surprises.”48  First, there is a risk that the models are underestimating the warming 
potential of different emission scenarios.49  Currently, observed effects are occurring 
faster than the models predicted, which indicates that the models may be 
conservative.50  For example, polar ice is melting faster than the models predicted, 
driven partially by sea level temperatures rising more quickly than the models 
anticipated, indicating that the deleterious effects may occur sooner or more intensely 
than previously imagined.51     
Second, there is a risk that warming will happen too quickly for ecological 
systems that support human existence to adapt.  As one economic report recently 
summarized, “Climate change is shifting ecosystems and destroying forms of natural 
capital such as glaciers, forests, and ocean ecosystems, which provide important 
services to human communities.  This in turn imperils the human habitat and economic 
activity.”52  To date, observed changes include melting glaciers that affect water 
 
47 NCA4, Vol 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 57 (“Both large-scale shifts in the 
climate system (sometimes called’ tipping points’) and compound extremes have the potential to 
generate outcomes that are difficult to anticipate and may have high consequences.”). 
48 Id. 
49 NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 422 (“There is very high 
confidence in the likelihood of the existence of positive feedbacks and tipping elements. . . . There 
is very high confidence that some feedbacks can be quantified, others are known but cannot be 
quantified, and others may yet exist that are currently unknown.”); see also NCA4 Vol 2, Climate 
Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66 (“[D]ue to their systematic tendency to underestimate 
temperature change during past warm periods, models may be more likely to underestimate than 
overestimate the long-term future change.”). 
50 Id.; see also WEF, Global Risks Report 2020 supra note 18 at 30. 
51 “The Greenland Ice Sheet is Melting Unusually Fast” The Economist (June 17, 2019); Naomi 
Oreskes & Michael Oppenheimer Scientists Have Been Underestimating the Pace of Climate 
Change, Scientific American (Aug. 19, 2019) available at 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/scientists-have-been-underestimating-the-pace-
of-climate-change/ (summarizing content of book, Discerning Experts that collects data 
demonstrating observational data that effects of climate change are occurring more rapidly than the 
models predicted). 
52 McKinsey Global Initiative, Climate Risk and Response: Physical Hazards and Socioeconomic 
Impacts 15 (January 2020) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/sustainability/our-insights/climate-risk-and-response-physical-hazards-and-
socioeconomic-impacts#. 
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supplies, melting sea ice and rising sea levels, desertification and lost agricultural 
capacity, changed precipitation patterns and increased flooding, stressed ecosystems 
and increased fire risk, altered weather patterns and mismatched timing for ecological 
events.  Adapting to these changes requires time, but the effects of climate change are 
happening more quickly than anticipated, which does not leave much time. 
Third, there is a risk that we will encounter feedback loops or tipping points, 
which could produce sudden and catastrophic harm by disrupting natural ecological 
cycles.53  One example of a disruptive feedback loop appears to be happening with 
forests in the western United States.  Abnormally warm temperatures have enabled 
widespread bark beetle infestations that have killed thousands of trees.54  Extensive 
swaths of dead trees, combined with hotter summer temperatures and drier forest 
conditions, increase the likelihood of catastrophic wildfire events.55  Catastrophic 
wildfires emit huge amounts of carbon, further exacerbating global warming.  The 
ecological disruption is further amplified because where the forest once served as a 
global sink, it now acts as a source of emissions.56  According to the 2014 Quadrennial 
Fire Review, a strategic assessment of wildfire risks on federal lands, wildfires 
currently produce about seventeen percent of the GHGs released annually in the United 
States.57  
 Another example of a disruptive feedback loop is permafrost, which stores 
large amounts of methane and carbon (significantly more than the atmosphere currently 
 
53 NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66 (“Self-reinforcing cycles or 
feedbacks within the climate system have the potential to amplify and accelerate human-induced 
climate change.”). 
54 David D. Breshears et al., Regional Vegetation Die-Off in Response to Global-Change-Type 
Drought, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 15144-15148 (2005); 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0505734102. 
55 Jessica E. Halofsky et al., Changing Wildfire, Changing Forests: The Effects of Climate Change 
on Fire Regimes and Vegetation in the Pacific Northwest, USA, 16 FIRE ECOLOGY 4:1 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s42408-019-0062-8. 
56 See Robert B. Keiter & Matthew McKinney, Public land and Resources Law in the American 
West: Time for Another Comprehensive Review?, 49 ENVTL. L. 1, 19 (Winter 2019) (making the 
same observation and noting that since the mid-1980s, the western wildfire season has increased by 
seventy-eight days and large fires are burning much longer than before); see also NCA4 Vol. 2 
Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 36 (Box 1.3). 
57 Booz Allen Hamilton, 2015 Quadrennial Fire Review produced on behalf of USDA Forest Service 
Fire & Aviation Management and the Department of Interior Office of Wildland Fire (May 2015). 
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holds).  As permafrost thaws, it releases methane and carbon emissions into the 
atmosphere, further exacerbating global warming.58  The permafrost holds more carbon 
than has ever been released by humans.59  A sudden warming event and subsequent 
carbon release could therefore be catastrophic.60  The bland language of the Fourth 
National Assessment betrays the risk that it conveys.  Tipping points or feedback loops 
“may even shift Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are 
very different from those experienced in the recent past.”61   
Finally, the sudden transitions associated with abrupt ecological disruption 
could devastate social infrastructure, threaten human lives and safety, produce 
widespread environmental degradation, and undermine access to water, food, and other 
key resources.62  Consistent with this risk, the National Security, Military, and 
Intelligence Panel on Climate Change summarized the threat assessment of warming 
above 2°C as “very likely” to include significant insecurity and destabilization.  “All 
regions will be exposed to potentially catastrophic levels of climate security threats, 
the consequences of which could lead to a breakdown of security and civilian 
infrastructure, economic and resource stability, and political institutions at a large 
scale.”63 
  Efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change have found their way into the 
courtroom.  After weighing all of the evidence, recent court decisions reveal broad 
judicial consensus on the causes, extent, urgency, and consequences of climate 
 
58 NCA4 Vol. 1 Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 29. 
59 Samson Reiny, NASA TV: Climate, Arctic Shifts to a Carbon Source Due to Winter Soil 
Emissions (Nov. 8, 2019) available at https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2019/arctic-shifts-to-
a-carbon-source-due-to-winter-soil-emissions (last visited Dec. 6, 2020) (providing background and 
describing results of recent study indicating that the massive amounts of carbon stored in permafrost 
are being released at a faster rate than presumed in climate modeling). 
60 NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 29, 95, 314, 417, and 419.. 
61 NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66. 
62 WEF, Global Risks Report 2020 supra note 18 at 33-65; see generally NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate 
Science Report in Brief supra note 17 (listing risks to infrastructure, human safety, water quality 
and supply, forests and other ecosystem health, pressures on wildlife and threats of extinction, 
disruption to agriculture and food supplies, etc.). 
63 NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment supra note 11 at 9. 
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change.64  As the Ninth Circuit summarized, “Copious expert evidence establishes . . . 
[that] the problem is approaching the point of no return.  Absent some action, the 
destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life threatening natural disasters, and 
jeopardize critical food and water supplies.”65  The Tenth Circuit summarized the 
situation succinctly: “Less greenhouse gas emissions equals less climate change.”66   
Although establishing a carbon emissions budget is politically and technically 
complex, the fundamental principle is simple: reducing the risks of climate change 
requires immediate efforts to reduce or offset GHG carbon emissions from every 
source.67  The potentially dire future portrayed by climate models is preventable with 
specific, deliberate action.68  Moreover, the foresight offered by climate models also 
imposes a responsibility: “If we see it coming, we must act in a manner that is 
commensurate to the scale and scope of the threat.”69 
B. The BLM has authority over nationally significant GHG emissions.  
The BLM has responsibility for, and authority over, significant GHG emissions 
in the U.S.  In 2017, the U.S. was the world’s largest producer of crude oil and natural 
gas.70  As of fiscal year 2018, the BLM administered more than 38,000 onshore oil and 
gas leases extending across more than 25.5 million acres (almost 40,000 square-
 
64 Banda, Climate Science in the Courts supra note 17 at 2 (noting that the existence of climate 
change and that human activity exacerbates climate change are no longer disputed by the federal 
government or industry litigants). 
65 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020). 
66 WildEarth Guardians v. United States BLM, Case No. CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77409 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020). 
67 NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment supra note 11 at 13 (“Mitigating these risks requires 
quickly reducing and phasing out global greenhouse gas emissions.  As there are numerous policy 
options for doing so, we refrain from recommending a single course of action.  Instead, we call for 
the world to achieve net-zero global emissions as soon as possible.”).  See generally House Select 
Committee on the Climate Crisis, Solving the Climate Crisis Majority Staff Report 116th Congress 
479-496 (June 2020) (proposing a multi-faceted national strategy to achieve net-zero greenhouse 




70 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Hydrocarbons (2018) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36292 (EIA, 
Crude Oil Production). 
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miles).71  The BLM also administered coal leases covering over 458,000 acres.72  
During FY 2019, these lands produced over 274 million barrels of oil—an additional 
784 million barrels were produced from federally managed offshore areas and Native 
American lands.73  Lands managed by the BLM also produced 3.3 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas and 302 million tons of coal.74  With great production comes great 
responsibility for the resulting emissions.  
Fossil fuels extracted from public lands produce almost one quarter of all U.S. 
CO2 emissions, according to an inventory conducted by the United States Geological 
Survey (“USGS”).75  Coal mined on public lands accounted for more than 13 percent 
of U.S. emissions over the past decade.76  Energy development on public lands also 
accounted for 7.3 percent of total U.S. emissions of methane, another powerful GHG.77 
Even after production stops, abandoned and orphaned wells and coal mines continue 
to emit.  According to the emission inventory produced by the EPA, abandoned oil and 
gas wells have steadily produced between 6 and 7 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2 
equivalent (CO2e) annually between 1990 and the present.78  Abandoned coal mines 
have produced similar amounts each year.79   
Despite climate forecasts, and having intimate knowledge of its emissions 
portfolio, the BLM has been fostering development that will further increase emissions 
 
71 Bureau of Land Mgnt., Dept. of the Interior, Oil and Gas Statistics 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics (last visited 
May 14, 2020).  
72 Bureau of Land Mgnt., Dept. of the Interior, Coal Data https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-
and-minerals/coal/coal-data.  
73 Dept. of the Interior, Natural Resources Revenue Data (last visited May 14, 2020) 
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/?tab=tab-production.  
74 Id. An additional 1 billion and 393 million cubic-feet of natural gas were produced from federally 
managed offshore and Native American lands, respectively.  Id.   
75 USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8. 
76 Adam Aton, Fossil Fuel Extraction on Public Lands Produces One Quarter of U.S. Emissions 
Sci Am. Nov. 27, 2018 available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fossil-fuel-
extraction-on-public-lands-produces-one-quarter-of-u-s-emissions/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) 
77 USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8. 
78 US EPA GHG Inventory 2018 supra note 34 at Executive Summary, ES-8. 
79 Id. 
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from federal land.80  The Trump Administration  encouraged and authorized additional 
coal development, instead of completing the Programmatic EIS initiated to modernize 
the coal program and incorporate climate change concerns.81  Similarly, the BLM 
rolled back methane reduction efforts.82  Instead of implementing a 2016 rule that was 
expected to reduce methane emissions on federal lands by 41-60 percent,83  the BLM 
worked hard to devitalize the rule: first postponing, then suspending, then replacing the 
rule.84   
Between now and 2030, the United States is on track to account for 60 percent 
of world growth in oil and gas production, expanding extraction by at least four times 
 
80 For a real-time summary of the Trump Administration’s efforts to eliminate or reverse 
environmental policies, see Regulatory Rollback Tracker, Harvard Law, 
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited June 3, 2020). 
81 See E.O. 13783, Energy Independence supra note 11; and Exec. Order No. 13868, Promoting 
Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019); Secretarial Order 
3348 “Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium” (Mar. 29, 2017) (“I find that the public interest is 
not served by halting the Federal coal program for an extended time, nor is a PEIS required to 
consider potential improvements to the program.”).   
82 See U.S. Dep’t of Interior., Waste Prevention, Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and 
Resource Conservation Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 C.F.R. 3160 (2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-28/pdf/2018-20689.pdf (announcing recission 
of Obama-era rule that clarified BLM’s authority to set royalty rates at or above 12.5 percent). 
83 See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and Resource Conservation Rule, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016) postponed by Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and 
Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 15, 
2017).   
84 See Blake A. Watson, Nullify, Postpone, Suspend, Stay, and Replace: The Trump Administration 
and the Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 44 DAYTON L. REV. 363, 382 (2019) [hereinafter Watson, 
Methane Waste Prevention Rule] (“Shortly after Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017, 
efforts were underway to abrogate the methane waste prevention rule, which became effective just 
three days earlier.  The first attempt, which involved the passage of nullification legislation, failed 
when the necessary resolution was defeated in the United States Senate.  The BLM thereafter 
postponed the compliance dates set forth in the MWPR; however, this action was held to be unlawful 
agency action.  Undeterred, the BLM suspended the compliance dates; however, this action was 
enjoined.  Despite these legislative and regulatory setbacks, the Trump Administration and the oil 
and gas industry obtained a judicial stay of the 2016 waste prevention rule for most of 2017 and 
2018 and the BLM, in September 2018, promulgated a replacement rule.  The ultimate fate of the 
rescinded 2016 rule now depends on the outcome of pending lawsuits challenging the 2018 rule.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 






more than any other country.85  According to the United Nations Environment Program 
(“UNEP”) Emissions Gap Report, U.S. emissions are at least 15 percent above target 
for pledged emission reductions.86  With every year that emissions continue to rise, the 
goals in the Paris Agreement slip further out of reach.  Although the U.S. has 
withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, the scientific basis for the agreement remains 
unchanged, even if the Agreement has unraveled for political reasons.  Emission 
reductions are necessary to keep global warming below 1.5°C.  Because emission 
reduction targets have not been met in the past, more aggressive reductions will be 
necessary in the years ahead if we are to keep warming below 1.5°C.87   
As a proportion of U.S. emissions, the 24 percent of national CO2 emissions 
under BLM authority are a significant contribution.88  In comparison, the Supreme 
Court found that “judged by any standard,” 6 percent of global GHG emissions was a 
“meaningful contribution” to GHG concentrations and sufficient to support standing to 
sue over injuries allegedly resulting from GHG emissions.89  In American Electric 
Power, just 10 percent of domestic emissions was deemed sufficient to support 
standing for the Second Circuit and at least four judges on the Supreme Court.90  In 
Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Department of Interior, the court recognized 
that the federal coal program managed by the BLM was responsible for an estimated 
11 percent of United States GHG emissions, and that the plaintiffs had a concrete 
 
85 Kelly Trout & Lorne Stockman, Drilling Toward Disaster: Why U.S. Oil and Gas Expansion Is 
Incompatible with Climate Limits, Oil Change International (Jan. 2019) available at 
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2019/01/Drilling-Towards-Disaster-Web-v3.pdf (last visited 
April 27, 2020). 
86 U.N. Env’t Programme, The Emissions Gap Report 2019 20 (2019) available at  
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y (noting that the U.S. target emission reductions were 26-28 percent from 2005 levels by 2025 
and expressing concern that the Trump administration has reduced anticipated emission reductions 
from power plants and frozen requirements for GHG reductions in vehicle emissions and fuel 
economy standards, in addition to encouraging increased fossil fuel production on public land). 
87 Chelsea Harvey, Nathaniel Gronewold, Global CO2 Footprint to Break Another Record in 2019, 
E&E News (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061716715 
88 See USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8.  
89 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007). 
90 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d 564 U.S. 410 (2011); See 
also Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz, Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change 
Attribution, 45 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 57, 153-169 (2020) (reviewing cases including American 
Electric). 
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interest in decisions regarding the production, transportation, and or consumption of 
coal due to its environmental effects.91  Finally, in Juliana v. United States, the district 
court noted that U.S. agencies have authority over 14 percent of global GHGs, which 
the court considered sufficient to satisfy the causation requirements of the court’s 
standing analysis.92  These court decisions finding much smaller percentages of 
emissions to be significant contributions to climate change put the BLM’s authority 
over 24 percent of U.S. GHG emissions into perspective.  This perspective clarifies 
that even if individual permitting decisions appear de minimis, the BLM’s permitting 
authority is nationally and globally significant.   
Despite its clear contribution to climate change, the BLM is accelerating efforts 
to lease federal lands and approve drilling permits for oil and natural gas, while 
restricting public involvement and environmental review.93  Along the way, the BLM 
has walked away from its commitment to modernize the federal coal program,94 
 
91 Citizens v. Clean Energy v. United States Dept. of Int., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1274 (D. Mont. 
2019). 
92 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d on other grounds 947 
F.3d 1159 (2020). 
93 See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13783, Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (March 28, 2017) (directing agencies to 
“review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency 
actions . . . that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy 
resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources” and 
recommend actions that “could alleviate or eliminate aspects of agency actions that burden domestic 
energy production.” See generally Michael C. Blumm and Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands 
Revolution: Redefining “The Public” in Public Land Law, 48 ENVTL. L. 311 (2018) (describing 
multiple ways in which Trump-Era reforms reduced or eliminated avenues for public involvement 
in federal land use planning decisions). 
94 See BLM, Federal Coal Program, Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Scoping 
Report, Volume I, Executive Summary, ES-4 (Jan. 2017) (“[M]odernization of the Federal coal 
program is warranted. . . . This modernization should focus on ensuring a fair return to Americans 
for the sale of their public coal resources; addressing the coal program’s impact on the challenge of 
climate change; and improving the structure and efficiency of the coal program in light of current 
market conditions.”) [hereinafter Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report].  But see BLM, 
Finding of No Significant Impact, “Lifting the Pause on the Issuance of New Federal Coal Leases 
for Thermal (Steam) Coal, Environmental Assessment 1, 7 (Feb. 26, 2020) (“Because the BLM 
made a reasoned decision not to complete the PEIS, the information the Jewell Order endeavored to 
produce is unavailable and too complex in nature to produce in speculation. . . . Lifting the Pause 
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rescinded all programs and policies addressing climate change,95 and adopted an 
illogically restricted interpretation of its authority to mitigate the adverse effects of 
proposed land uses.96  It is no wonder that some people feel that the BLM has lost its 
way.97 
III. The BLM is Legally Obligated to Consider Climate Science and Manage 
for Climate Change. 
The BLM is charged with managing a vast resource portfolio consistent with 
statutory management priorities set forth by Congress in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (“FLPMA”) and other guiding statutes.  Though the BLM has broad 
discretion, that discretion must be guided by Congressional priorities and exercised 
within statutory boundaries.98 Under FLPMA, BLM must protect air and atmospheric 
resources and prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of public lands.”99  As applied 
to managing oil and gas leasing, a federal court recently summarized BLM’s 
management responsibilities: “BLM has a duty to prevent undue waste; and protect the 
 
meant that the BLM resumed normal leasing activities consistent with practices established and 
implemented for nearly 40 years.” 
95 See, e.g., S.O. 3349 American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017) Sec. 5(b) (instructing all 
departments to compile and rescind climate related policies); Dept. of Interior, Final Report: Review 
of the Department of Interior Actions that Potentially Burden Domestic Energy 16  (Oct. 24, 2017) 
available at 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/interior_energy_actions_report_final.pdf 
[hereinafter DOI, Report of Actions that Potentially Burden Energy]. 
96 See BLM, Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-93, Compensatory Mitigation (July 24, 2018) 
available at https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2018-093 [https://perma.cc/AFT4-YSKK] [hereinafter 
“IM 2018-93”]. For a further discussion, see infra Section V.B.; see also Justin Pidot, The Bureau 
of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 30 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(2019) [hereinafter Pidot, The BLM’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy]. 
97 Jim Kenna, Opinion, Bureau of Land Management Leaders Have Lost Their Way: A Former State 
Director Argues Narrow Interests Have Dominated the Agency’s Direction Opinion, High Country 
News (Paonia, Colo), May 26, 2020 https://www.hcn.org/articles/south-opinon-bureau-of-land-
management-leaders-have-lost-their-way (last visited May 29, 2020). 
98 California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *41-48 
(July 15, 2020)  (holding that the BLM exceeded its statutory discretion by prioritizing the 
economics of individual well operators over BLM’s statutory public welfare obligations articulated 
in the FLPMA and the MLA).  
99 California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *40 (July 
15, 2020) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). 
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interests of the United States and safeguard the public welfare.” 100   Ignoring climate 
change and jeopardizing resources charged to its care is inconsistent with the BLM’s 
duty to engage in reasoned decision-making according to its statutory charter, 
particularly where the BLM has acknowledged the risks of climate change in the past.  
A. The BLM’s Organic Act establishes a standard of care; directs the 
BLM to manage according to a multi-generational horizon; and 
identifies resources, including the atmosphere, that should not be 
permanently impaired.   
FLPMA serves as the BLM’s organic statute.   In FLPMA,  Congress 
articulated a standard of care for the BLM’s management of federal assets; established 
a multi-generational investment horizon; and identified specific environmental values, 
including the atmosphere, for the BLM to protect from permanent impairment and 
unnecessary or undue degradation.101   
Although FLPMA grants the BLM broad management discretion, it sets a limit 
to that discretion by articulating a standard of care that prevents unnecessary or undue 
degradation, avoids permanent impairment, and ensures sustained yield of natural 
resources.  Congress imposed a mandatory duty when it stated that the BLM “shall, by 
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands.”102  Other phrases in FLPMA elaborate on the standard of 
care.  Federal lands shall be managed through land use plans “on the basis of multiple 
use and sustained yield.”103  The terms “multiple use” and “sustained yield” are 
 
100 Id. at *40 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).  
101 California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *41 
(July 15, 2020) (“The words of the statute require that it be read broadly.  More specifically, the 
statute mandates that BLM act comprehensively to prevent the waste of public resources.”). 
102 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (emphasis added). 
103 43 U.S.C. §1732 (a) (directing that the BLM “shall manage the public lands under principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield, in accordance with land use plans developed under section 202 [43 
U.S.C. §1712]); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (directing that the BLM “shall develop” land use 
plans that “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield”); § 1701(a)(7) 
(articulating the federal policy that “goals and objectives be established by law as guidelines for 
public land use planning and that management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield 
unless otherwise specified by law); § 1701(a)(8) (directing that “public lands be managed in a 
manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air 
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 






separately defined.  “Multiple use” requires the BLM to make “judicious use” of 
federal lands without “permanent impairment” to the productivity and quality of the 
environment.104 It also instructs the BLM to utilize resource values in a combination 
“that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people . . . and not 
necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the 
greatest unit output.”105  “Sustained yield” includes “the achievement and maintenance 
in perpetuity” of renewable resources.106  These principles, distinctly articulated in 
separate parts of FLPMA, define the standard of care Congress established for the 
BLM’s management decisions.  
Congress also established a multi-generational investment horizon as part of 
the BLM’s management priorities.  FLPMA requires the BLM to find a combination 
of uses that “will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.”107  
In defining the term “multiple use,” Congress reiterated the multi-generational time 
frame for management duties, instructing BLM to find a combination of resource uses 
“that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and 
nonrenewable resources.”108  The references to “maintenance in perpetuity” of 
renewable resources in the definition of “sustained yield” further indicate 
 
and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish 
and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide outdoor recreation and human occupancy 
and use”);.  
104 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (defining “multiple use”). 
105 Id.  Other phrases in the statute echo this theme.   See 43 U.S.C. §1702(c)(“making the most 
judicious use of the land for some or all of the resources . . .to provide sufficient latitude for periodic 
adjustment in use to conform to changing needs and conditions”); § 1702(c) (“multiple use means 
the management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people . . . that takes 
into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources . 
. . with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily the 
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.); 
§1712(c)(5) (land use plans shall consider present and potential uses of public lands); § 1712(c)(7) 
(land use plans shall “weigh long term benefits to the public against short term benefits”). 
106 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h). 
107 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
108 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
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Congressional intention to impose a multi-generational investment horizon on the 
BLM.109  
Finally, Congress identified discrete ecological values that should be managed 
without “permanent impairment” in the multiple use balance including watersheds, 
rangeland, forests, fish and wildlife, air, and the atmosphere.110  The statute’s 
introductory declaration of policy lists several resources including “the quality of . . . 
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological 
values” as well as preservation of “certain public lands in their natural condition,” in 
order to provide “food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals, and 
“outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.”111 By using the introductory 
declaration of policy to descriptively list ecological values that should be protected, 
Congress expressed an intent as to what must not be permanently impaired or subject 
to unnecessary or undue degradation in the balance of multiple use.112   
Notably, the list of assets to be stewarded by the BLM includes “atmospheric 
values.”  The inclusion of atmosphere as a resource is specific and unambiguous.  “The 
preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”113  History 
indicates that Congress understood the risks and challenges of anthropogenic climate 
change when it listed “air and atmospheric values” as one of the values that the BLM 
must protect.  Nine years before FLPMA was passed, climate change had already been 
identified as an environmental risk.  Reviewing the history of climate change 
awareness, the Ninth Circuit summarized that “[a]s early as 1965, the Johnson 
Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to 
 
109 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h). 
110 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).   
111 43 U.S.C. §1701(8). 
112 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shamble Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § (7th ed. 2008) 
47:8, at 313-14 (“The legislative purpose set forth in the purview of an enactment is assumed to be 
the express legislative policy, and only those subjects expressly exempted by the proviso should be 
freed from the operation of the statute.”); id. § 46:05 at 177 (“Where there is inescapable conflict 
between general and specific terms or provisions of a statute, the specific will prevail.”). 
113 Amalgamated Sugar Co .LLC v. Vilsack, 555 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald 
v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties.”114  For 
example, a White House Report published on November 5, 1965 detailed 
environmental challenges facing the nation, including “atmospheric carbon 
dioxide.”115  The report recognized that GHG emissions were altering the composition 
of the atmosphere.  “Within a few short centuries, we are returning to the air a 
significant part of the carbon that was slowly extracted by plants and buried in the 
sediments during half a billion years. . . . The part that remains in the atmosphere may 
have a significant effect on the climate.”116  Thus, Congress was on notice that climate 
change was a risky, negative byproduct of fossil fuel development when it instructed 
the BLM to manage public lands “in a manner that will protect the quality of the . . . 
air and atmospheric . . . values.,” and it intended the BLM to manage accordingly.117   
 More importantly, Congress understood that there would be multiple, 
unforeseen challenges in striking the right balance of multiple uses.  FLPMA’s broad 
language grants the BLM regulatory flexibility to respond to new scientific evidence 
and changing societal needs.  As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when interpreting 
the Clean Air Act, even if Congress “might not have appreciated the possibility that 
burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without 
regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon 
render [the Act] obsolete.”118  This is no less true for FLPMA, where broad language 
similarly “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall 
such obsolescence.”119  Climate models provide an unprecedented peek into the world 
facing future generations, eliminating significant doubt as to the consequences of 
continuing our current emissions trajectory.120  The BLM’s regulatory authority over 
our nation’s hydrocarbon resources is governed by the standard of care set forth in 
 
114 Juliana v. U.S., 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020) (“As early as 1965, the Johnson 
Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to climate, global 
temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties.”). 
115 The White House, Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel President’s Science Advisory 
Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment (November 1965).  
116 Roger Revelle et al., Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Appendix Y4 in The White House, Report of 
the Environmental Pollution Panel President’s Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality 
of Our Environment (November 1965). 
117 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). 
118 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
119 Id. 
120 NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment of Climate Change supra note 11 at 13. 
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FLPMA. A deliberate strategy to mitigate the risks of increased GHG emissions caused 
by hydrocarbon production would be consistent with FLPMA’s standard of care, multi-
generational investment horizon, and instruction to protect ecological values, including 
the atmosphere.121 
B. The BLM has already publicly acknowledged that increasing GHG 
emissions will result in permanent impairment to ecological 
systems, including those charged to its care. 
In January 2016, the BLM undertook an investigation of the federal coal 
leasing program, culminating in a Scoping Report that was issued in January 2017.122  
The report concluded that modernization of the federal coal program was warranted 
due, in part, to “the coal program’s impact on the challenge of climate change.”123  The 
Scoping Report referred to scientific assessments that had been completed after the 
EPA’s Endangerment Finding and stated: “The new assessments also confirm and 
further strengthen the conclusion that greenhouse gases endanger public welfare, and 
emphasize the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions due to their projections 
that show greenhouse gas concentrations climbing to ever-increasing levels in the 
absence of mitigation.”124  
In particular, the BLM emphasized a study, published by the National Research 
Council, concluding that without emission reductions, the atmospheric composition 
“may be approaching a critical climate threshold beyond which rapid and potentially 
permanent—at least on a human timescale—changes not anticipated by climate models 
. . . may occur.”125  The BLM also emphasized a second study published by the National 
Research Council regarding the risks of abrupt impacts to society and ecosystems if 
physical thresholds within the earth’s system, including the atmospheric composition, 
are crossed.126  One of the abrupt impacts emphasized by the BLM was the threat of 
“rapid state changes in ecosystems and species extinctions,” which the BLM 
 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at ES-4. 
124 Id. at 5-50.  
125 Id. (quoting National Research Council, Understanding Earth’s Deep Past: Lessons for Our 
Climate Future 2 (2011) available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13111/understanding-earth’s-
deep-past-lessons-for-our-climate-future.  
126 Id. at 5-50 to 5-51 (discussing National Research Council, Abrupt Impacts of Climate Change: 
Anticipating Surprises (2013) available at http://nap.edu/18373). 
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characterized as examples of irreversible impacts “that are expected to be exacerbated 
by climate change.”127  Relying upon these and other studies, the BLM concluded, 
“reducing emissions of greenhouse gases across the globe is necessary in order to avoid 
the worst impacts of climate change and underscore the urgency of reducing emissions 
now.”128  As discussed in Section II.A., in the three years since that report was released, 
scientific consensus has only become stronger and the situation more urgent. 
The BLM did not use the words “permanent impairment” when discussing the 
risk of crossing thresholds and exacerbating species extinction in the Scoping Report, 
but the connection is evident.  Rapid ecological state changes and widespread species 
extinctions are irreversible events that will cause “permanent impairment” to 
ecological values entrusted to the BLM’s care.  For example, “range, timber . . . 
watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural, scenic, scientific, and historical values”129 
will all be affected by “rapid state changes in ecosystems and species extinctions.”130  
Because crossing a critical climate threshold puts resources under the BLM’s care at 
risk of permanent impairment, permitting decisions that increase the risk of crossing a 
critical climate threshold are inconsistent with the statutory definition of multiple use.  
It does not matter that the BLM discussed the risks of “crossing a critical climate 
threshold” in the context of coal mining, rather than oil and gas development.  The 
same facts apply to any fossil fuel.  Continuing to permit expanded development of 
fossil fuels exacerbates the risk of crossing a critical climate threshold and causing 
permanent impairment to the quality of the environment and the productivity of the 
land managed by the BLM, contrary to the statutory standard of care set forth in 
FLPMA.   
Although the BLM has broad discretion when making decisions under the 
Mineral Leasing Act, it’s discretion “remains constrained” by the statutory priorities 
set forth in FLPMA.131  Having already acknowledged the scientific urgency of 
reducing GHG emissions, BLM permitting decisions should comport with that 
 
127 BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-51. 
128 Id. at 5-52. 
129 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
130 Compare BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-51. 
131 Citizens for a Clean Environment v. United States D.O.I., 384 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (Apr. 19, 
2019) (Although the BLM enjoys broad discretion to make mineral leasing decisions on federal 
lands, it “remains constrained, however, by the Federal Lands Policy Act and the Mineral Leasing 
Act.”). 
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conclusion and demonstrate a rational connection between the facts found and the 
decision made.  Like every agency, the BLM is bound by the fundamental requirement 
of administrative law that agencies engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” and act 
within the bounds of their statutory duties.132  Final agency actions that do not meet the 
standards of reasoned decisionmaking may be challenged under the Administrative 
Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious.133  As the Supreme Court recently pointed 
out, “the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”134  One 
of those square corners is the requirement to “examine the relevant data and articulate 
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.”135  The BLM’s management and permitting 
decisions must satisfy this standard.  Where the “relevant data” uniformly indicates 
that increasing GHG emissions will exacerbate climate change and cause permanent 
impairment to resources entrusted to the BLM, there is no satisfactory explanation for 
ignoring that data in the BLM’s management or permitting decisions.   
Courts have shown an increasing willingness to require agencies to grapple 
with the realities of climate change in fulfilling their statutory duties.  For example, 
although the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
has enjoyed broad discretion in establishing fuel efficiency standards,136 it met the 
boundaries of that discretion in 2007 when it failed to incorporate climate change into 
its analysis in setting fuel efficiency standards.  In Center for Biological Diversity v. 
NHTSA, the Ninth Circuit found that the fuel economy rule issued by NHTSA was 
arbitrary and capricious because it failed to prioritize energy conservation, which was 
Congress’ purpose in enacting the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”).137  
In defending the rule, which prioritized other factors, like market dynamics and cost of 
 
132 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Case No. 18-587, 519 U.S. ____ (June 
18, 2020); 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3254, *20 (noting that the procedural requirements of administrative 
law establish the mechanism “by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their 
actions subject to review”). 
133 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). 
134 Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3254at *32. 
135 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
136 Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that NHTSA 
appropriately balanced consumer demand with the statutory policy of fuel conservation in light of 
the broad guidelines established by Congress in EPCA); Pub. Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (consideration of economic hardship was within agency discretion). 
137 Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181-82, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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implementation, over energy conservation, NHTSA relied upon previous court 
decisions that deferred to NHTSA’s discretion to balance priorities in setting fuel 
efficiency standards.138  The court distinguished those cases.  “[T]he persuasiveness of 
the analysis in [previous cases] is limited by the fact that they were decided two decades 
ago, when scientific knowledge of climate change and its causes were not as advanced 
as they are today.”139  Citing climate change concerns, the court pointed out, “The need 
of the nation to conserve energy is even more pressing today than it was at the time of 
EPCA’s enactment. . . . What was a reasonable balancing of competing statutory 
priorities twenty years ago may not be a reasonable balancing of those priorities 
today.”140 Because NHTSA failed to prioritize energy conservation, which was “the 
fundamental purpose of the statute” and “an explicit statutory factor that NHTSA 
‘shall’ consider,” failure to prioritize conservation was arbitrary and capricious.141  The 
court emphasized, “‘An agency may not ignore factors Congress explicitly required to 
be taken into account.’”142   
 The same legal standard and logic applied by the Ninth Circuit in Center for 
Biological Diversity v. NHTSA applies to BLM permitting decisions.  What may have 
been a reasonable balancing of multiple use priorities twenty years ago, may not be a 
reasonable balancing of those priorities today.  Climate models uniformly indicate that 
the long-term, cumulative impacts of increasing fossil fuel development will 
permanently impair resources that Congress instructed the BLM to judiciously manage.  
The BLM has acknowledged that those models and other studies “underscore the 
urgency of reducing emissions now.”143  The incremental nature of individual 
permitting decisions does not shield the BLM from its statutory duty to manage on a 
multi-generational horizon, avoid permanent impairment, and prevent unnecessary or 
undue degradation to the resources under its care.  A fundamental purpose of FLPMA 
is to identify a standard of care and impose a multi-generational investment horizon on 
the BLM’s management decisions.  Permitting decisions that exacerbate climate 
change by allowing an unmitigated increase in GHG emissions arbitrarily and 
 
138 Id. at 1195-97. 
139 Id. at 1198. 
140 Id. at 1197-98. 
141 Id. at 1205-06. 
142 Id. at 1205-06 (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F. 3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
143 BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-52; see also ES-4 
(concluding that the federal coal program must be modernized in part to address the coal program’s 
impact on the challenge of climate change). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 






capriciously ignore statutory factors, like the duty to avoid permanent impairment of 
resource values, including the atmosphere.  Accordingly, without incorporating climate 
science into its land management decisions, the BLM cannot fulfill its statutory duties 
under the Federal Land Management Policy Act or its legal responsibility to avoid 
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
C. Addressing climate change is not a policy preference. 
Recent court decisions reveal a judicial trend recognizing that climate science 
is not a policy preference.  A comprehensive and insightful review of climate related 
cases between 2015 and 2020 published by the non-partisan Environmental Law 
Institute reveals that “vast judicial agreement exists on the causes, extent, urgency, and 
consequences of climate change.”144  This observation “holds true across U.S. federal 
and state courts, across different types of proceedings, and across jurisdictions,” 
including international jurisdictions.145  The report takes care to point out that all 
parties, including government agencies like the BLM, appeared to agree on basic 
climate science even if they disagreed on the legal implications.146  
Several courts have reminded agencies that facts about the risks of global 
warming survive changes of administration.  “[E]ven when reversing policy after an 
election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual findings without a reasoned 
explanation.”147  For example, in Indigenous Environmental Network v. United States 
Department of State, the federal court reviewed the Trump Administration’s reversal 
of a decision to deny approval for the Keystone XL Pipeline.148  The history is as 
follows.  In 2015, the Obama Administration declined to issue a cross border permit 
for the pipeline.149  The denial was based on the risk of exacerbating climate change, 
 
144 Banda, Climate Science in the Courts supra note 17 at vi. 
145 Id. at 73-74. 
146 Id. 
147 Indigenous Environmental Network v. U.S. Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018), 
rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019). 
148 Id.  The Record of Decision resulted in a National Interest Determination and a Presidential 
Permit to allow TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP to construct a cross-border oil pipeline known 
as Keystone XL, which would carry tar sands oil from the interior of Alberta to Steele City, 
Nebraska. 
149 U.S. Dep’t. of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: Trans Canada 
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit (Nov. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 
Keystone ROD] 
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as set forth in the 2015 Record of Decision (“2015 ROD”).150  As justification for the 
denial, the 2015 ROD referred to the necessity of reducing global carbon emissions in 
order to keep warming below 2°C.  “This is a critical time for action on climate change.  
The science is clear and widely accepted, including among foreign governments, that 
climate change is occurring now, that human activity is the dominant cause, and that 
climate change impacts are already being felt around the world.”151  The 2015 ROD 
acknowledged that approval of the pipeline would be understood as a decision to 
facilitate GHG-intensive crude imports, undermining the transformation to low-carbon 
economies.  “Therefore, a decision to approve this proposed project would undermine 
U.S. objectives . . . which identified climate change and the reduction of global 
emissions as a national security priority.”152  In reversing course, the Trump 
Administration simply removed the paragraphs referring to climate change, and 
characterized the change as a “mere policy shift.”153  The court rejected the argument 
that a policy shift could not be found arbitrary and capricious.154  “An agency cannot 
simply disregard contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the 
past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”155  
A conclusory analysis that climate change impacts were inconsequential did not rise to 
a reasoned explanation, and without a reasoned justification for disregarding the 
urgency of climate change, the agency decision was arbitrary and capricious.   
 Other courts have reached similar conclusions when agencies have ignored 
earlier factual findings related to climate change.  Recently, in the context of climate 
change, a federal court for the Northern District of California held that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard “prohibits [an agency] from disregarding available scientific 
evidence that is some way better than the evidence [it] relies on.”156  That case, 
California v. Bernhardt, considered  the BLM’s justification for replacing a regulatory 
scheme designed to minimize methane waste in oil and gas production (the 2016 Waste 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 31. 
152 Id. at 28. 
153 U.S. Dep’t. of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: Trans Canada 
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit (Mar. 23, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 
Keystone ROD] 
154 Indigenous Environmental Network, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 583. 
155 Id. at 584. 
156 California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *75 
(N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Prevention Rule) with a less stringent set of regulations (2018 Recission).  The BLM’s 
justification for the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule relied heavily on the benefits of 
reducing GHG emissions.157  The BLM’s analysis included a benefit-cost assessment 
that considered the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC).158   As the court summarized, “This 
approach was developed over several years through robust scientific and peer-reviewed 
analyses and public processes, and represents the best available science on this 
issue.”159  When the BLM replaced the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule with a rule 
designed to be less burdensome on industry (2018 Recission), it did not use the SCC 
metric.160  Instead, it developed an “interim” metric that excluded the global 
consequences of climate change.161  The BLM’s interim metric underestimated the 
domestic effects of climate change and excluded the global effects of climate change 
(like disregarding the effects on 8 million citizens living abroad) when considering the 
consequences of its new rule relaxing methane emission standards for oil and gas 
development on federal land.162  In finding this approach arbitrary and capricious, the 
court summarized, “An agency simply cannot construct a model that confirms a 
preordained outcome while ignoring a model that reflects the best science available.”163 
Consequently, the court found that the BLM’s decision to ignore climate science 
 
157 Id. at *14 (recounting the BLM’s original estimates that the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule “would 
generate up to $14 million in additional royalties, as well as annually avoid an estimated 175,000-
180,000 tons of methane emissions and reduce emissions of both volatile organic compounds by 
250,000 to 267,000 tons). 
158 Id. at *16 (explaining that the SCC metric was developed by the Interagency Working Group to 
provide “a single, harmonized value for greenhouse gas emissions for federal agencies to use in their 
regulatory impact analyses”); id. at *71 (summarizing that the metric estimates the present value of 
damages caused by each additional ton of greenhouse gas emitted at a point in time—or the benefit 
of avoided GHG emissions). 
159 Id. at *71. 
160 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184. 
161 California v. Bernhardt, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 at 71.   
162 Id. at 80.   
163 Id. at *85. The court’s analysis further emphasized that political machinations cannot erase facts.  
Recognizing that Executive Order 13783 issued by the Trump Administration had withdrawn the 
relevant technical support documents for the SCC metric, the court pointed out that the Executive 
Order “did not and could not erase the scientific and economic facts that formed the foundation for 
that estimate . . . .  In other words, the President did not alter by fiat what constitutes the best 
available science.”  Id. at 77.   
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“‘fail[s] to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem’ and ‘runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency.’”164  
Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, a federal district court reviewed a 
Fish and Wildlife Service decision reversing course on a decision to list the wolverine 
as endangered due to habitat degradation caused by climate change.165  The court 
carefully reviewed the administrative record and concluded that the justifications 
offered by the agency failed to provide a reasoned justification for the course 
reversal.166  “[T]he Service’s stance here borders on the absurd—if evidence shows that 
wolverines need snow for denning purposes, and the best available science projects a 
loss of snow as a result of climate change where and when the wolverines den, then 
what sense does it make to deny that climate change is a threat to the wolverine simply 
because research has yet to prove exactly why wolverines need deep snow for 
denning.”167  Because the decision ran counter to the evidence before the service, it too 
was reversed as arbitrary and capricious.168   
The court took a similar stance in California v. EPA, when reviewing a 
challenge to the EPA’s announcement that it would reconsider greenhouse gas 
emission standards adopted in 2012 for model years 2022 to 2025 motor vehicles.169  
The extensive rulemaking record supporting the 2012 standards estimated that it would 
save four billion barrels of oil, reduce GHG emissions by two billion metric tons, and 
 
164 Id. at 80 (alterations in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)). 
165 Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Mont. 2016). The court also rejected 
FWS efforts to characterize the consequences of climate change as uncertain due to modeling 
challenges and a lack of information about the wolverine.  “[S]uch conclusory treatment based on a 
dearth of information is impermissible under the APA. . . . The service must rationally explain why 
the uncertainty regarding a particular issue counsels in favor of one conclusion rather than the 
opposite conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
166 See, e.g., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (“Why did the Service make the decision it did in the Proposed 
Rule, based on what it determined to be the best available science, and reject that decision eighteen 
months later?  Based on the record, the Court suspects that a possible answer to this question can be 
found in the immense political pressure brought to bear on the issue. . . . The listing decision in this 
case involves climate science, and climate science evokes strong reactions.”). 
167 176 F. Supp. at 1005. 
168 Id. at 1003.   
169 940 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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generate net lifetime fuel savings of $3,400 to $5,000 per vehicle sold.170  But after the 
change in presidential administrations, “the EPA changed lanes” and announced that it 
would reconsider the 2012  standard.171  Although the court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction because no “final action” had occurred yet, it took an opportunity to 
counsel the EPA: “If EPA’s rulemaking results in changes to the existing 2012 
standards, it will be required to provide a reasoned explanation and cannot ignore prior 
factual findings and the supporting record evidence contradicting the new policy.”172 
In Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Department of Interior, the court 
rejected the BLM’s characterization of coal leasing decisions as “mere policy shifts.”173  
In that case, the Trump administration had issued an order reversing a 2016 moratorium 
on new coal leasing and directed the BLM to expeditiously process coal lease 
applications and modifications based on regulations and guidance in place prior to the 
moratorium.174  One justification supporting the 2016 moratorium was to “avoid the 
risk of ‘locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of coal” under 
the prior regulatory standards.175  The BLM characterized the reversal as “a mere policy 
shift and return to the status quo.”176 The court recognized the order as a major federal 
action with potentially significant environmental impacts, thus triggering NEPA.177    
Because expediting coal mining could have a significant effect on the environment, it 
was arbitrary and capricious to lift the moratorium without first evaluating the 
environmental impacts in accordance with NEPA.178  Although the court declined to 
 
170 Id. at 1346. 
171 Id.at 1348. 
172 Id. at 1353. 
173 Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Dept. of Int., 384 F. Supp. 1264, 1281 (D. Mont. Apr. 
19, 2019). 
174Id. at 1277.  In February 2017, BLM possessed forty-four pending lease and lease modification 
applications.  Id. at 1271. Coal from federal land already constituted over 40 percent of U.S. coal 
production.  Id.  In 2014, the federal coal program was responsible for an estimated 11 percent of 
total U.S. GHG emissions.  Id. at 1274.  Processing new leases would expand production and 
increase GHG-related emissions.  Id. at 1280. 
175 Id. at 1280. 
176 Id. at 1279. 
177 Id. at 1279 (“The existence of a NEPA triggering event depends on whether there is a new 
proposed major federal action.  The threshold to trigger NEPA remains relatively low.  A NEPA 
triggering event merely requires that a plaintiff raise substantial questions whether a project may 
have a significant effect on the environment.”).   
178 Id. at 1279, 1281. 
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order the BLM to prepare an EIS as opposed to an EA, the court reminded the BLM 
that determining significance requires a rational connection between the facts found 
and the decision made.179  In light of all the available science, it is unlikely that any 
agency, no matter how creative, could gather a “convincing statement of reasons” to 
explain why continuing to issue coal leases without mitigating the risks of climate 
change would have an insignificant effect on the environment. 
These cases demonstrate a judicial trend recognizing that climate change is a 
scientific fact, not a policy preference. 180  Although agencies have broad discretion in 
how to respond to climate change, decisions that ignore climate change are increasingly 
recognized as arbitrary and capricious.  Looking ahead, this judicial trend has 
implications for the BLM.  Having already acknowledged the scientific consensus that 
increasing GHG emissions will exacerbate climate change and increase the risk of 
crossing critical climate thresholds, the BLM “cannot simply disregard contrary or 
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past.”181  A conclusory analysis 
that the climate change impacts of a single permitting decision are inconsequential does 
not rise to a reasoned explanation where the BLM has permitting authority over 24 
percent of the nation’s GHG emissions.182  Focusing solely on the individual impacts 
of a permitting decision, without considering the BLM’s national authority over GHG 
emissions fails to consider an important aspect of the problem and runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency.183  With roughly 250 million acres of land surface under 
 
179 384 F. Supp. 3d at 1282 (“If Federal Defendants determine that an EIS would not be necessary, 
however, the Federal Defendants must supply a ‘convincing statement of reasons’ to explain why 
the Zinke Order’s impacts would be insignificant.” (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
180 Indigenous Environmental Network v. U.S. Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 584 (D. Mont. 
2018), rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019) (“An agency cannot simply disregard 
contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore 
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”); California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-
05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *75 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (rejecting argument that an executive order relieved the 
BLM’s duty to consider the social costs of climate change because “the President did not alter by 
fiat what constitutes the best available science”);  
181 Indigenous Environmental Network, 347 F. Supp. at 584. 
182 See infra section II.B. 
183 Compare California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128961 *80 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
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its care, a statutory duty to protect environmental attributes that will be affected by 
climate change (like water resources, fish and wildlife habitat, and atmospheric values), 
permitting authority over 24 percent of the nation’s GHG emissions, and the ability to 
increase or decrease future emissions, the BLM simply cannot continue to ignore 
climate change in its permitting decisions without violating the management priorities 
set forth in FLPMA and the reasoned decision-making standard set forth in the APA.   
D. Past is not prologue.  Agencies must plan and act based on 
foreseeable future conditions. 
 “[T]he assumption that current and future climatic conditions will resemble 
the recent past is no longer valid.”184  This statement, made in the Fourth National 
Assessment on Climate Change, identifies a challenge for agencies who must make 
management decisions that project into the future.  Because climate change is creating 
a “new normal” with altered climatic patterns, projections that are based on 
continuation of existing conditions may not meet this burden.185     
The BLM must engage in reasoned decision-making.  As the Supreme Court 
articulated almost forty years ago, an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious “if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that 
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”186  
As a practical matter, the “best available science” is critical to understanding 
“important aspect[s] of the problem” and part of the “evidence before the agency.”  
 
184 NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 26. 
185 This has prompted several commentators to make observations about the death of stationarity.  
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 14-15 (2010); Mark Squillace, 
Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 415, 424 (2019) [hereinafter 
Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning] (“‘Stationarity’ is the idea that differences in an 
observed natural phenomenon occur within a fixed or constant range over time”); P. C. D. Milly et 
al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573-74 (2008)”); see also 
IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 5, ¶ A.3.1 (“Impacts on 
natural and human systems from global warning have already been observed (high confidence). 
Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have already changed due 
to global warming (high confidence).”). 
186 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  
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Agencies decisions that “run counter to the evidence before the agency” or “entirely 
fail to consider an important aspect of the problem” do not meet the reasoned decision-
making standard required by the Administrative Procedure Act and elaborated upon by 
the Supreme Court.   
In the context of climate change, scientific consensus uniformly indicates that 
future conditions will diverge from the past.  Consistent with the requirement that 
agencies engage in reasoned decision-making, courts are becoming increasingly 
rigorous with the requirement that agencies consider forecasts and climate models to 
meaningfully discuss reasonably foreseeable conditions in light of climate change.  For 
example, in AquAlliance v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of 
Reclamation relied upon historical data from 1922 to 2003 to anticipate water supply 
for a 10-year water transfer program in California’s Central Valley.187  The court 
rejected this approach, holding that “[t]he past century is no longer a reasonable guide 
to the future for water management.”188  Climate change models indicated a 16 percent 
reduction in snow pack by 2035, which would alter the timing and amount of water 
supplies and pose a significant challenge for water resource management.189  The 
agency’s backward-facing conclusion that the climate change impacts to the project 
would be insignificant was arbitrary and capricious because it arose out of a “failure to 
consider an important aspect of the problem,” the strong scientific evidence of a much 
starker future.190 
Similarly, two additional cases found agency reliance on historic 
environmental conditions contrary to the best available science and therefore arbitrary 
and capricious.  In National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 
the court found the Service’s assumption that current climatic conditions would 
continue into the future contrary to the best available science and therefore arbitrary 
and capricious.191  NMFS had been called upon to issue a Biological Opinion on 
impacts to protected salmon species and that were likely to result from the continued 
operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System.  Noting the laundry list of 
challenges brought by climate change to the Pacific salmon population, the court found 
 
187 287 F. Supp. 3d 969, 1028 (E.D. Calif. Feb. 15, 2018). 
188 Id. at 1029. 
189 Id. at 1028-29. 
190 Id. at 1032 (internal quotations omitted). 
191 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 874 (D. Or. 2016). 
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that NMFS’s analysis “fails to properly analyze the effects of climate change.”192  
Among other problems, the court noted that the agency “assumed recent climate 
conditions would remain the same” and “did not engage in any analysis” to assess 
whether the future effects of climate change would diminish the effectiveness of 
proposed mitigation measures.193  Also, even though substantial scientific literature 
concluded that climate conditions in the ocean would worsen during the time frame of 
the analysis, the agency assumed that the recent historic condition of the ocean would 
“repeat itself.”194   
In Wild Fish Conservancy v. Irving, the federal court reached a near identical 
conclusion.195  In that case, the agency (NMFS) analyzed whether operating a fish 
hatchery would threaten the existence of endangered fish spawning in the same 
watershed.  “NMFS discusses the effects of climate change generally, and then 
proceeds with analysis on the apparent assumption that there will be no change to the 
hydrology of Icicle Creek.”196  The court went on to conclude that although the agency 
need not conduct a study or build a model, “its analysis must consider that the best 
available science . . . suggests that baseline historical flow averages may not be 
effective predictors of future flows.”197  In other words, using the past as prologue is 
arbitrary and capricious where climate models forecast change. 
Uncertainty inherent in predicting the future is not an excuse for agencies to 
avoid looking at climate projections. For example, the Arctic grayling is a freshwater 
fish that depends on cold water and adequate stream flow for survival.198  In evaluating 
whether to list the Arctic Grayling under the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service acknowledged a recent trend showing lower stream flows and warmer 
water temperatures, but relied instead upon limited data suggesting the possibility that 
the Arctic grayling could adapt by migrating to cold water refugia in one portion of the 
 
192 Id.   
193 184 F. Supp. 3d at 917 (“NOAA Fisheries had information that climate change might well 
diminish or eliminate the effectiveness of some of the BiOp’s habitat mitigation efforts, but does 
not appear to have analyzed these effects.” 
194 Id. at 918. 
195 221 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1227-28 (E.D. Wa. 2016). 
196 Id. at 1233. 
197 Id. at 1234. 
198 Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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habitat.199  In other words, the FWS declined to consider the cumulative effects of 
climate change on observed conditions.  Although the available models indicated that 
“water temperatures will likely increase with climate change in the future” and 
“dewatering threats will be exacerbated” by climate change,200 the FWS claimed that 
“uncertainty about how different temperature and precipitation scenarios could affect 
water availability make projecting possible synergistic effects of climate change on the 
Arctic grayling too speculative at this time.”201  In Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Zinke, the court found this approach “unacceptable.”202  “It is not enough for FWS to 
simply invoke ‘scientific uncertainty’” and rely on uncertainty as a foil against 
scientific analysis.203  Agencies must consider the evolving nature of climate science 
and failing to grapple with climate change projections that would exacerbate current 
conditions was arbitrary and capricious.204   
In contrast, agency decisions that incorporate climate change projections have 
been upheld, even where there is uncertainty about how climate change may affect 
specific locations.205  For example, in Alaska Oil & Gas Association v. Jewell, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the FWS designation of critical habitat for the polar bear against industry 
challenges that the designation was overly protective.206  In addition to considering 
multiple models, the FWS also noted that “the observational record of current sea ice 
losses indicates that losses seem to be about 30 years ahead of the modeled values, 
which suggests a seasonally ice-free Arctic may come a lot sooner than expected.”207  
 
199 Id. at 1070. 
200 Id at 1073. 
201 Id. at 1072. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 1072 (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coalition Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1028 (9th 
Cir. 2011)). 
204 Id. at 1073.   
205 See e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2016) (FWS designation of 
critical habitat for the polar bear upheld despite some lack of specificity regarding proof that the 
entire designated landscape contained required features of denning and barrier island habitats used 
by polar bears.  “While the agency may not base its listings on speculation or surmise, where there 
is no superior data, occasional imperfections do not violate [the ESA.” (internal quotations omitted). 
206 815 F.3d 544, 559 (9th Cir. 2018). 
207 Id. 
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The FWS properly took this information into account when considering how climate 
change would likely affect ongoing changes to the polar bear habitat.208   
Similarly, in Colorado v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the court 
upheld the agency’s reliance on forecasts regarding climate change and drought in 
considering whether to list the Gunnison sage-grouse as threatened.209  The FWS 
observed that Colorado was warming more rapidly than other areas of the country, 
cited multiple studies on how hot and dry conditions affect the sage grouse, and listed 
other consequences of climate change including prolonged drought, fire, cheatgrass 
invasion, and insect reduction.210  The court found that the FWS assessment of an 
increased threat from climate change was not arbitrary and capricious.211 
In summary, where climate change forecasts predict degraded ecological 
functions, agencies cannot avoid considering future degradation by relying on historic 
data.  Even though specific detail about the local effects of a projected trend may not 
be available, agency decisions that ignore forecasted trends and rely upon local historic 
data have been found arbitrary and capricious.  For the BLM, this trend also has clear 
management implications.  The BLM cannot rely solely upon the past: it must consider 
a future complicated by climate change.  Where available climate models forecast 
climatic changes, the BLM must consider the implications of those changes, even if 
the exact parameter of the change is uncertain.  Impacts that were historically 
insignificant may become significant when assessed in light of the environmental 
trends indicated by climate forecasts. With climate modeling pointing toward a hotter 
dryer future, the need for BLM to incorporate the effects of climate change into its 
management decisions grows more pressing by the day.  Consistent with the duty to 
avoid permanent impairment and prevent unnecessary or undue degradation, land use 
 
208 See also Safari Club Int’l v. Salazar (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and 
Section 4(d) Rule Litig.), 709 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cr. 2012) (upholding FWS listing of polar bear as 
endangered based on climate change models projecting loss of sea ice throughout the arctic and 
observations that actual sea ice loss outstripped pace of model forecasts “FWS understood and 
explained the models’ limitations and carefully explained why its limited reliance on the models 
was justified.”) 
209 362 F. Supp. 3d 951, 969 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2018). 
210 Id. at 971. 
211 Id.; see also Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dept. of Int., No. 16-cv-01165-JCS, Slip Op. (N.D. Cal. 
May 15, 2018) 
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decisions, including permitting decisions and mitigation strategies must adjust to 
reflect the foreseeable future conditions. 
IV. NEPA’s statutory mandate and the Department of the Interior’s 
implementing regulations require the BLM to take a “hard look” at the 
environmental consequences of a decision, including cumulative effects of 
climate change.   
NEPA was enacted by Congress in recognition of “the profound impact of 
man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences of . . . resource exploitation.”212  NEPA uses public 
disclosure to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations.”213  The Supreme Court summarized the 
statute’s methodology as follows: “The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of 
NEPA are thus realized through a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require that 
agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences, and that provide for broad 
dissemination of relevant environmental information.”214  The twin aims of public 
disclosure and careful consideration of environmental impacts are “intended to help 
public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental 
consequences and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”215   
To ensure that the environmental consequences of an action are properly 
considered and disclosed, agencies must “utilize a systemic, interdisciplinary approach 
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the 
environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making, which may have an 
impact on man’s environment.”216  For every “major federal action” that may 
significantly affect “the quality of the human environment,” agencies must prepare a 
 
212 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
213 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1). 
214 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
215 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (“NEPA 
has twin aims.  First it places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of 
the environmental impact of a proposed action.  Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the 
public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”). 
216 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A). 
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“detailed statement.”217  The document’s level of detail depends on the likely 
significance of the environmental consequences.218 
All “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” require the agency to prepare an environmental impact statement 
(“EIS”).219  An EIS “shall” include a description of (1) the environmental impact of the 
proposed action; (2) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided; (3) 
alternatives to the proposed action; (4) the relationship between local short-term uses 
of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity; and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.220  
When the BLM prepares an EIS it must also include a discussion of alternatives 
including, “appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed 
action or alternatives.”221  The Record of Decision accompanying an EIS must “state 
whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the 
alternative selective have been adopted, and if not, why they were not.”222   
For the past 42 years, determining whether environmental impacts are 
“significant” has required an analysis of direct223 and indirect224 effects of the proposed 
 
217 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
218 The following discussion refers to CEQ NEPA regulations (40 C.F.R. §§1501.1 et seq), which 
were amended on July 26, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020).  Where the discussion relies 
upon the earlier version of regulations, the citation is provided with (2019).  Reference to the new 
regulations is indicated by specifying where the regulation will be codified in 2020.  As much as 
possible, where the regulatory change has no meaningful effect on the discussion, reference to the 
new version of regulations is provided.  This section also references Department of Interior NEPA 
regulations (43 C.F.R. §§ 46.10 et seq.), which have not been amended, but the 2019 version of the 
CFR for those regulations is the most current version to date.   
219 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.400 to 46.450 (2019). 
220 Id. § 4332(C). 
221 42 U.S. C. § 4332(E); 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.415(a)(6)(2019), (b); 46.420(b)- (d)(2019); 46.425(2019); 
46.130(2019).  See also 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e) 
(requiring consideration of mitigation measures).  
222 85 Fed. Reg. at 43369, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(2020). 
223 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2019). (Direct effects “are caused by the action and occur at the same 
time and place.)  
224 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2019) (Indirect effects are “caused by the action and later in time or 
farther removed in the distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.  Indirect effects may include 
growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, 
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action as well as the cumulative impacts225  of the proposed action when considered in 
light of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.226  These terms were 
defined by regulations published by the White House Council on Environmental 
Quality (“CEQ”), interpreted extensively by courts, and supplemented by individual 
agency regulations implementing NEPA.  Similarly, significance has been measured 
in terms of the action’s context and intensity.227  But, in July 2020, the CEQ revised 
those regulations, omitting references to direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts.228  As 
discussed in more detail below, these terms and the relevant case law remain applicable 
to the BLM’s duties under NEPA’s statutory requirements and BLM’s own regulations, 
notwithstanding the CEQ’s regulatory revisions. 
If the effects of an agency action are not expected to be significant, an agency 
may  comply with NEPA through the preparation of a less extensive Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”).229  Like an EIS, an EA describes the reasonably foreseeable 
impacts associated with the proposed action, as well an analysis of alternatives and the 
impacts of the alternatives.230  If the EA indicates that the impacts of a proposed action 
are likely to be significant, the agency prepares an EIS that discusses those impacts in 
greater detail.231  If the agency determines that the impacts fall below the significance 
 
population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other natural systems, 
including ecosystems.”). 
225 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019) (“Cumulative Impact is the impact on the environment which results 
from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertake 
such other actions.  Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively 
significant actions taking place over a period of time.”) 
226 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(2019); 85 Fed. Reg. at 43369, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2020). 
227 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.27 (2019) (defining “significantly” as requiring considerations of both context 
and intensity); § 1508.8 (2019) (“Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but 
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.”). 
228 Final Rule: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 433331 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
Parts 1500, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, and 1518 (2020). 
229 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2019); 43 C.F.R. § 46.300.  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5.  
230 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b); 43 C.F.R. § 46.310.  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.5(c)(2). 
231 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1); 43 C.F.R. § 46.300. See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a). 
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threshold, the agency then prepares a finding of no significant impact on the 
environment (“FONSI”).232   
Critically, an agency can (and often does) impose mitigation measures to 
reduce the degree of impacts below the significance threshold and thereby avoid EIS 
preparation.  Such approval documents are commonly referred to as Mitigated 
FONSIs.233  As the CEQ explains, “[t]he appropriate mitigation measures can be 
imposed as enforceable permit conditions, or adopted as part of the agency final 
decision in the same manner mitigation measures can be adopted in the formal Record 
of Decision that is required in EIS cases.”234  Agencies may also determine through 
regulation that a class of actions is eligible for a Categorical Exclusion (“CE”) because 
those actions are unlikely to have significant individual or cumulative environmental 
effects.235  In “extraordinary circumstances,” actions otherwise covered by a 
categorical exclusion may require further analysis.236  Thus, even actions that are 
normally categorically excluded from NEPA, still “must be evaluated to determine 
whether it meets any of the extraordinary circumstances.”237  BLM regulations provide 
a list of “extraordinary circumstances,” including actions that “have direct relationship 
to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 
environmental effects.”238  
 
232 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13; 43 C.F.R. § 46.325.  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.6(a) 
233 See Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing circuits that endorse the practice and 
explaining: “This situation occurs when an agency or involved third party agrees to employ certain 
mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise significant impacts of an activity on the 
environment to a level of insignificance.  In this way, a FONSI could be issued for an activity that 
otherwise would require the preparation of a full-blown EIS.”).  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43361, to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c) (discussing Mitigated FONSIs). 
234 Forty Most Asked Questions Regarding CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 
46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18038 (March 23, 1981). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43361, to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.6(c) (“If the agency finds no significant impacts based on mitigation, the mitigated 
finding of no significant impact shall state any enforceable mitigation requirements or commitments 
that will be undertaken to avoid significant impacts.). 
235 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2019); 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.205 (2019).  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
236 43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(a) (2019). 
237 43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(1) (2019). 
238 43 C.F.R. § 46.215. 
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Recent case law applying NEPA in the context of climate change demonstrates 
that courts are increasingly willing to delve into the factual record to ensure that 
agencies have fulfilled NEPA’s statutory mandate by taking a “hard look” at the 
environmental impacts of a proposed action.  Additionally, despite a long tradition of 
deference to agencies’ expertise, recent decisions have not extended that deference to 
NEPA analyses that ignore the implications of the scientific consensus on climate 
change.  As the Tenth Circuit summarized, “We do not owe the BLM any greater 
deference on the question at issue here because it does not involve ‘the frontiers of 
science.’  The BLM acknowledged that climate change is a scientifically verified 
reality.  Climate science may be better in 2017 than in 2010 . . . but it is not a scientific 
frontier.”239   
The following sections explore these trends, after first discussing why the case 
law is still relevant to the BLM’s duty to comply with NEPA, even if the Trump 
Administration’s recent regulatory changes to CEQ regulations are upheld.  
A. Changes to the CEQ regulations do not amend Department of 
Interior NEPA regulations, which incorporate the original CEQ 
regulations. 
The CEQ issues regulations that implement NEPA and that apply to all federal 
agencies.240 In the summer of 2020, the CEQ proposed and finalized new regulations 
to implement NEPA, and these revised regulations include sweeping changes to NEPA 
practice.  For example, the new regulations omit the term “cumulative impacts” and 
delete section 1508.7, which defined that term.241  These changes do not, however, 
eliminate the BLM’s duty to consider the cumulative effects in its management actions 
 
239 WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2017) (referring to the United 
States Supreme Court standard for deference to agency decisions where decisions engage “scientific 
frontiers” that are part of “barely emergent knowledge and technology.”). 
240 See Exec. Order No. 11991, Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality 
(May 24, 1977) (directing federal agencies to comply with the CEQ’s NEPA regulations).  Other 
agencies may promulgate their own NEPA regulations to address issues that are unique to their 
NEPA practice.  The Department of the Interior’s NEPA regulations, for example, are found in 43 
C.F.R. part 46. 
241 Final Rule: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 433331 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
Parts 1500, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, and 1518 (2020). 
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(including oil and gas permitting decisions) for at least two reasons.  First, the duty to 
consider indirect and cumulative environmental effects arises out NEPA’s statutory 
requirements, which cannot be eliminated or restricted by regulation.  Second, BLM 
regulations still require an analysis of cumulative effects and those regulations remain 
in force despite the CEQ’s actions. 
The duty to broadly consider the environmental effects of an action, including 
indirect and cumulative effects, arises out of NEPA’s statutory mandate, which cannot 
be amended away by regulation.242  NEPA’s action forcing mandate is clear, EISs 
“shall” include a discussion of “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented.”243  The term “any” is broad and 
necessarily includes indirect and cumulative effects.  If Congress intended a narrow 
analysis, it would have used narrow language.  But Congress chose instead to 
emphasize the comprehensive inquiry it intended by requiring agencies to “recognize 
the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems.”244  “Worldwide” 
and “long-range” problems are precisely the kinds of problems that rarely result from 
one individual action, but instead reflect the combined effect of hundreds if not 
thousands of smaller actions.  The Congressional Declaration of National 
Environmental Policy, moreover, recognizes “the profound impact of man’s activities 
on the interrelationship of all components of the natural environment, particularly the 
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial 
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances.”245  
“[P]opulation growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource 
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances” are not individual 
actions, but the product of multiple actions, and their environmental impacts can be 
assessed only by considering the cumulative impacts of multiple separate and distinct 
actions.   
 
242 See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederal agencies may not ignore 
statutory mandates or prohibitions merely because of a policy disagreement with Congress.”); 
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129861 *63 (July 
15, 2020) (quoting In re Aiken County). 
243 42 U.S.C. § 4332(a)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). 
244 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F). 
245 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (emphasis added). 
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The breadth of the mandate set forth in NEPA is consistent with legislative 
discussions leading up to the Act’s passage.  The Senate recognized that “Important 
decisions concerning the use and the shape of man's future environment continue to be 
made in small but steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized 
mistakes of previous decades.  Today it is clear that we cannot continue on this 
course.”246  A summary of findings published as a part of the Senate hearing in April 
1969 also described cumulative effects when it explained one of the problems that 
NEPA was intended to solve.  “[A] major difficulty with the planning process: a series 
of separate decisions, each individually justifiable, can, in the aggregate lead to results 
which, had they been foreseen, would have been avoided.”247  Congress was clear, 
agencies were not to lose sight of the forest by fixating on individual trees.   
Such an interpretation is consistent with case law interpreting the Act.  The CEQ first 
promulgated regulations guiding NEPA’s implementation in 1978, eight years after 
NEPA’s enactment.  These regulations responded in part to a need to clarify the scope 
of analysis required under NEPA, and CEQ’s regulations reflected the developing 
judicial consensus.  Relying on the Act alone, courts consistently found that NEPA’s 
statutory language mandates broad consideration of the potential effects, including 
cumulative effects, of a proposed federal action.248  In 1975, for example, the Second 
Circuit found that the U.S. Navy erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of 
four separate river and harbor dredging projects that together would have dumped more 
than 5 million cubic yards of contaminated spoils into Long Island Sound. As the court 
explained:  
[A]n agency may not . . . treat[] a project as an isolated ‘single-shot’ 
venture in the face of persuasive evidence that it is but one of several 
 
246 Report of the Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to accompany S. 
1075, S. Rept. 91-296 at 5 (July 9, 1969). 
247 Hrg. April 16, 1969, Appx 1, p183 (Summary of Findings and Recommendations, Resources and 
Man, Prepared by the Committee on Resources and Man, National Academy of Sciences- National 
Research Council). 
248 See generally, City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976);  Nat. 
Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir., 1975) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis 
for dredging the Thames River), see also Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring 
a cumulative effects analysis), and Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 1975) (same). 
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substantially similar operations, each of which will have the same 
polluting effect in the same area.  To ignore the prospective cumulative 
harm under such circumstances could be to risk ecological disaster.  As 
was recognized by Congress at the time of passage of NEPA, a good 
deal of our present air and water pollution has resulted from the 
accumulation of small amounts of pollutants added to the air and water 
by a great number of individual, unrelated sources.  ‘Important 
decisions concerning the use and the shape of man’s future 
environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which 
perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous 
decades.’  S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).  NEPA 
was, in large measure, an attempt by Congress to instill in the 
environmental decision-making process a more comprehensive 
approach so that long term and cumulative effects of small and 
unrelated decisions could be recognized, evaluated and either avoided, 
mitigated, or accepted as the price to be paid for the major federal 
action under consideration.249 
Similarly, the Supreme Court agreed that NEPA’s statutory language required a 
comprehensive analysis that includes cumulative effects.  “[W]hen several proposals . 
. . that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are 
pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be 
considered together.”250  Thus, the requirement to consider indirect and cumulative 
effects arises from NEPA’s statutory language, and cannot be swept away by a 
regulatory amendment.  
 
249 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975).  See also, Swain v. Brinegar, 
517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975) (“NEPA is clearly intended to focus concern on the ‘big picture’ 
relative to environmental problems. It recognizes that each ‘limited’ federal project is part of a large 
mosaic of thousands of similar projects and that cumulative effects can and must be considered on 
an ongoing basis.”); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322 (8th Cir. 
1974) (“NEPA is concerned with indirect effects as well as direct effects. There has been increasing 
recognition that man and all other life on this earth may be significantly affected by actions which 
on the surface appear insignificant.”); and Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) (agency’s 
“piecemeal” analysis of urban renewal program violated NEPA). 
250 Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976). 
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The second reason that caselaw interpreting the BLM’s obligation to consider 
cumulative effects is still relevant is more technical and specific.  The Department of 
the Interior’s (“DOI”) own regulations still explicitly require a cumulative effects 
analysis.  To ensure that the environmental consequences of an action are properly 
considered Congress directed “to the fullest extent possible” that “all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall . . . “develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure 
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given 
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking.”251  Consistent with the statute’s 
mandate, the DOI adopted implementing regulations that apply to the BLM.252   
The DOI regulations incorporate by reference the implementing NEPA 
regulations originally drafted by the Council on Environmental Quality in 1978.253  
Section 46.20 of the DOI regulations provides a chart demonstrating the correlation 
between DOI regulations and CEQ regulations.254  Some DOI regulations stand alone, 
without a corresponding CEQ regulation.255  Other DOI regulations build upon the 
corresponding CEQ regulation and do not make sense alone.  For example, DOI 
regulation section 46.115 entitled “Consideration of past actions in the analysis of 
cumulative effects” corresponds to CEQ regulation 1508.7 entitled “Cumulative 
impact.”256  Section 46.115 (DOI regulation) states: “[W]hen considering the effects of 
past actions as part of a cumulative effects analysis, [bureaus] must analyze the effects 
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. §1508.7 [“cumulative impact”] and in accordance with 
relevant guidance issued by the Council on Environmental Quality.”257  Although the 
CEQ published changes to its regulations, the Department of Interior has not begun 
rulemaking to amend its NEPA regulations.  This begs the question, which version of 
CEQ regulations is incorporated by reference to the BLM’s NEPA regulations?    
 
251 Id. § 4332(B). 
252 43 C.F.R. § 46.10 et seq. 
253 Id. § 46.20 (This part supplements, and is to be used in conjunction with, the CEQ regulations 
except where it is inconsistent with other statutory requirements.”).  The CEQ Regulations were 
finalized at 43 Fed. Reg. 56003 (Nov. 29, 1978). 
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
256 Id. (corresponding 43 C.F.R. § 46.115 (2019) with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019)). 
257 Id. (the regulation specifically refers to a memo dated June 24, 2005, “or any superseding Council 
on Environmental Quality Guidance”). 
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Thankfully, the Office of Federal Register has encountered this problem before 
and drafted a regulation to address it.  “Incorporation by reference of a publication is 
limited to the edition of the publication that is approved.  Future amendments or 
revisions of the publication are not included.”258   
This approach parallels the relevant rule of statutory construction.  The so-
called “Lazarus Rule” holds that “where one statute refers to another and incorporates 
it, which incorporated statute is subsequently repealed, the statute repealed . . . remains 
in force so far as the adopting statute is concerned.”259  In the context of administrative 
law, this principle ensures that the requirements of notice and comment rulemaking are 
satisfied for each agency and each regulated public. One agency does not have 
authority to amend another agency’s regulations, which is what would happen if 
dynamic incorporation were allowed.260  The Administrative Procedure Act is clear:  
“[E]ach agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for 
the guidance of the public . . . substantive rules of general applicability adopted as 
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general 
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.”261  Each agency must “separately 
state and currently publish . . . each amendment, revision, or repeal” of its rules and 
policies.262  In other words, the DOI must amend its own regulations through notice 
and comment if it desires to eliminate the term “cumulative impacts”  The DOI cannot 
sidestep the Administrative Procedure Act by dynamically incorporating another 
agency’s rules.  This requirement fulfills the predictability expected from the regulated 
public, and it ensures that changes wrought by one agency are not foisted onto another.  
 
258 1 C.F.R. § 51.1(f) (2020). 
259 Fisher v. Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 932 (Neb. 1992) (internal quotations omitted).  
Presumably the name arose from the colorful introduction to the dissent provided in Fisher: “Not 
since ‘Lazarus, come forth’ has there been such a summons for the dead to associate with the living.”  
Id. at 934. 
260 See generally Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open Government Age, 36 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, (Winter 2013) (explaining regulatory use of incorporation by reference 
and demonstrating that dynamic incorporation is legally prohibited in the rulemaking context 
because it violates the principles of notice and comment). 
261 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(D).  
262 Id. at § 552(a)(2)(E). 
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“These requirements exist, in part, because markets and industries rely on stable 
regulations.”263   
Thus, notwithstanding the recent regulatory changes made by the CEQ, unless 
and until the DOI revises its own regulations, the BLM is still bound by the 1978 
version of the CEQ regulations that are incorporated into DOI’s regulations.  Those 
regulations, and relevant case law, still require an assessment of indirect and 
cumulative effects.  
B. The cumulative impacts discussion requires an analysis of 
contribution to climate change. 
The original CEQ NEPA regulations defined “cumulative impact” as “the 
impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action 
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless 
of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions.  
Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant 
actions taking place over a period of time.”264  DOI regulations adopt and build upon 
this definition.  Looking toward the future, “reasonably foreseeable” is defined as 
“federal and non-federal activities not yet undertaken, but sufficiently likely to occur, 
that a Responsible Official of ordinary prudence would take such activities into account 
in reaching a decision.”265  Looking toward the past, DOI bureaus must include the 
effects of past actions as part of the cumulative effect analysis and “analyze the effects 
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7” and relevant guidance.266   
 
263 California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129861 *40 
(July 15, 2020). 
264 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019). 
265 43 C.F.R. § 46.30 (2019) (explaining further that reasonably foreseeable future actions that “must 
be taken into account in the analysis of cumulative impact include, but are not limited to, activities 
for which there are existing decisions, funding, or proposals identified by the bureau”). 
266 Identifying the relevant guidance is also a challenge.  In 2010, the Council on Environmental 
Quality issued draft guidance instructing agencies on how to incorporate climate change into NEPA 
analyses.  That guidance was finalized in 2016.  Council on Environmental Quality, Exec. Office of 
the President, Memorandum of Federal Departments and Agencies, “Final Guidance for Federal 
Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of 
Climate Change in NEPA Reviews (2016), https://perma.cc/QP7E-7PUM.  Then it was withdrawn 
in 2017 by Executive Order 13783.  Claiming to favor “clean and safe development of our Nation’s 
vast energy resources,” the Order lacked factual underpinnings contained in prior guidance and 
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Climate change is “precisely the type” of cumulative environmental problem 
that NEPA was intended to address.267  The importance of considering GHG emissions 
as part of the cumulative effects analysis is reinforced by a growing tide of court 
decisions that are harshly critical of a lax cumulative effects analyses of climate change 
impacts.  For example, in Indigenous Environmental Network, the agency failed to 
analyze the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions the Keystone XL pipeline in 
combination with other pipelines being built.268  More recently, in WildEarth 
Guardians v. United States, the same court found that the BLM “failed to give a 
sufficiently detailed catalogue of past, present, and future projects” where it declined 
to quantify the immediate and downstream GHG emissions associated with several 
leases that were issued separately.269  In both instances, these errors required the 
agencies to revisit their NEPA analysis. 
Project-specific quantification is not enough, the BLM must put the emissions 
in context.  For example, in WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, the 
BLM quantified the greenhouse gas emissions anticipated from several oil and gas 
lease sales and calculated what percentage of national-level and state-level emissions 
 
provided no analysis as to how agencies should address climate change.  Because of this analytical 
gap, courts and litigants continue to reference the rescinded guidance consistent with its power to 
persuade.  See, e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1243 
n. 5 (D.N.M. 2018) (explaining history of guidance and concluding “to the extent the reasoning is 
logically sound and consistent with case law, the Court finds it persuasive and worthy of citation”); 
accord AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 287 F. Supp. 3d 969, 1028 n. 31  (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 15, 2018).  See also Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218, 228, 235 (2001)(recognizing 
that where a regulatory scheme is highly detailed and the agency can bring specialized experience 
to bear on subtle questions, an agency document may have the “power to persuade” according to 
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements”). 
267 Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative 
impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.  Any given rule . . . might have an 
‘individually minor’ effect on the environment, but these rules are ‘collectively significant actions 
taking place over a period of time.’” (citing 40 C.F.R. §1508.7). 
268 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 577 (D. Mont. 
2018). 
269 WildEarth Guardians v. United States, CV-18-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77409 (D. 
Mont. May 1, 2020). 
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the new emissions would comprise.270  The court held that this recitation fell short of 
providing a meaningful cumulative impacts assessment, which requires that 
quantification to be put into the context of state and nation-wide emissions.271  “The 
global nature of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions means that any single 
lease sale or BLM project will likely make up a negligible percent of state and nation-
wide greenhouse gas emissions.  Thus, if BLM ever hopes to determine the true impact 
of its projects on climate change, it can do so only by looking at projects in combination 
with each other, not simply in the context of state and nation-wide emissions.”272  In 
other words, a permitting official of “ordinary prudence”273 would consider the national 
context of past and future GHG emissions relevant when permitting an incremental 
increase.   
Courts have also rejected arguments attempting to skirt the cumulative impacts 
analysis by asserting that individual leasing decisions result in negligible GHG 
emissions.  For example, in San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management, the federal court in the District of New Mexico concluded, “Without 
further explanation, the facile conclusion that this particular [GHG emission] impact is 
minor and therefore ‘would not produce climate change impacts that differ from the 
No Action Alternative,’ is insufficient.”274  Similarly, in WildEarth Guardians v. 
United States Bureau of Land Management, the District of Montana rejected the 
BLM’s segmented analysis of several individual oil and gas lease sales.275  As it 
explained, “The cumulative impacts analysis was designed precisely to determine 
whether ‘a small amount here, a small amount there, and still more at another point 
could add up to something with a much greater impact.’”276  The court rejected several 
BLM arguments that assessing the specific impacts of GHG emissions from a specific 
lease sale was impossible due to the global nature of climate change.277  “[E]ven though 
 
270 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77409 at *27, *34. 
271 Id. at *34. 
272 Id. at *31. 
273 43 C.F.R. § 46.30 (2019). 
274 San Juan Citizens Alliance v. US Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1248 (D.N.M. 
2018). 
275 WildEarth Guardians, Case No. CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77409 *26 (D. 
Mont. May 1, 2020) (“BLM provided no catalogue here and little analysis to show the combined 
environmental impacts.”). 
276 Id. at *31 (quoting Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. BLM, 387 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
277 Id. at *30. 
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BLM cannot ascertain exactly how all of these projects contribute to climate change 
impacts felt in the project area, it knows that less greenhouse-gas emissions equals less 
climate change.”278  These decisions demonstrate judicial awareness of the scientific 
consensus that in the context of climate change, every incremental increase of GHG 
emissions is cumulatively significant.   
The cumulative effects analysis also requires agencies to consider the effects 
of actions outside of agency control.279  The Ninth Circuit applied this requirement in 
the context of climate change when requiring the National Highway Transportation 
Administration to provide contextual information in determining whether vehicle 
emission standards would contribute to climate change.  “[T]he fact that climate change 
is largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of the agency’s 
control does not release the agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions 
on global warming within the context of other actions that also affect global 
warming.”280  To emphasize that even modest contributions of greenhouse gases could 
be considered significant in the context of climate change, the court cited a phrase from 
a dissent by Judge Wald on the D.C. Circuit in 1990.  “‘[W]e cannot afford to ignore 
even modest contributions to global warming.  If global warming is the result of the 
cumulative contributions of myriad sources, any one modest in itself, is there not a 
danger of losing the forest by closing our eyes to the felling of the individual trees?’”281  
Putting a project in a regional context this way serves NEPA’s primary purpose of 
informing the relevant decisionmaker “whether, or how, to alter the program to lessen 
cumulative impacts on climate change.”282   
Some agencies have sought to avoid analyzing the consequences of high-
emissions scenarios by characterizing that trajectory as a “worst case scenario.”  NEPA 
does not require agencies to prepare a “worst case analysis.”283  However, as the cases 
 
278 Id. at *30-31 (emphasis added). 
279 Id. (defining cumulative impacts to include reasonably foreseeable future actions “regardless of 
what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions”). 
280 Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
281 Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., 
dissenting) overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)). 
282 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
283 See 51 Fed. Reg. 15618 (April 25, 1986) (rescinding the requirement to prepare a worst case 
analysis). 
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discussed above demonstrate, the cumulative effects analysis requires context.   
Climate change models use scenarios to provide the context necessary to assess risks 
related to different emission trajectories.284  For example, the world faces less risks if 
global warming is limited to 1.5°C through immediate and disciplined adoption of 
GHG emission reduction strategies than if temperatures are allowed to rise 
unchecked.285  In AquAlliance, the court rejected the agency’s attempt to characterize 
a high emissions scenario as a “worst case” scenario.  As the court explained, the 
rejected high “emissions scenario is not a ‘worst case’ scenario, at least not in the way 
that term is generally understood, in part because the record reflects that recent carbon 
dioxide emissions have, in fact, been higher than the [high] emissions scenario.”286  The 
court’s reasoning is logical and compelling.  An agency cannot ignore realistic 
projections, adopt a model using optimistic warming scenarios, and then make their 
aspirational assessment even less likely by contributing to a higher warming scenario 
by increasing GHG emissions.   
In summary, the context of climate change elevates the significance of 
incremental increases in GHG emissions.  Even though any single lease sale is likely 
to make up a negligible percent of state-wide greenhouse gas emissions, if the BLM 
ever hopes to determine the true impact of its project on climate change, it can only do 
so by looking at projects in combination.287  That includes taking responsibility for the 
24 percent of national emissions that arise out of fossil fuel development on federal 
land and for the cumulative effect of increasing that percentage of emissions.  Just as 
the BLM “knows that less greenhouse-gas emissions equals less climate change,”288 it 
also knows that more greenhouse gas emissions equal more climate change.  In order 
to achieve an emissions trajectory that will limit global warming to 1.5°C, the U.S. 
 
284 But see Safari Club Int’l v. Salazar (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 
4(d) Rule Litig.), 709 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cr. 2012) (noting FWS observation that the different model 
projections provided in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report are “fairly consistent” until mid-
century “because the state-of-the-art climate models used in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
have known physics connecting increases in greenhouse gas concentrations to temperature increases 
through radiation processes, and the greenhouse gas levels used in the models’ emissions scenarios 
follow similar trends until around 2040-2050” (internal alterations omitted)). 
285 See generally IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9. 
286 Id. at 1029-1030. 
287 Compare WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, CV-18-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77409 *31 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020). 
288 Id. at 30-31. 
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must make immediate emission reductions and achieve net zero by 2050.  Each step 
toward a higher emissions trajectory has the cumulative effect of exacerbating climate 
change. This acknowledgement should be part of the cumulative effects analysis 
because it provides context by demonstrating the “incremental impact of the action 
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”289  As 
Judge Wald recognized in 1990, failing to recognize that individually modest emissions 
contribute to climate change presents the danger of “losing the forest by closing our 
eyes to the felling of the individual trees.”290  
C. Upstream and Downstream GHG Emissions Related to Fossil Fuel 
Development Are Reasonably Foreseeable and Must Be Disclosed. 
Downstream combustion of fossil fuels is increasingly recognized as 
“reasonably foreseeable” when assessing the effects of a proposed action and therefore 
part of the cumulative effects analysis.  In addition to the emissions occurring at the 
exploration and production phases, multiple courts hold that NEPA requires the BLM 
to also consider the “indirect effect” of downstream emissions resulting from refining 
and consuming the fuel after it is sold.291  The D.C. Circuit explained this requirement 
 
289 40 C.F.R 1508.7 (2019). 
290 City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) 
overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ctr. 
For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Judge Wald’s dissent). 
291 See San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 
1242-1243 (D. N.M. 2018) (“[I]t is erroneous to fail to consider, at the earliest stage feasible the 
environmental consequences of downstream combustion of the coal, oil, and gas resources 
potentially open to development under the proposed agency action” (internal quotations omitted)). 
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21 GF-BMM, 2018 WL 
1475470 *13 (D. Mont. March 26, 2018) (holding that BLM must consider downstream combustion 
of coil, oil, and gas resources potentially open to development in RMPs); Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy 
Reg. Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that because greenhouse gas 
emissions are an “indirect effect of authorizing this [pipeline project] which [the agency] could 
reasonably foresee” the agency must provide a quantitative estimate of downstream emissions or 
explain why it could not do so); Montana Envtl. Inco. Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, No CV 
15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901, *3 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017) (holding that GHG emissions 
caused by burning coal extracted from a coal mine are indirect effects of coal trains); Dine Citizens 
Against Ruining Our Env’t v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 82 F. 
Supp. 3d 1201, 1213 (D. Colo. 2015) (finding that coal combustion are indirect effects of expanding 
coal mine) vacated as moot by 643 Fed. Appx. 799 (10th Cir. 2016); WildEarth Guardians v. United 
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in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: “[G]reenhouse gas 
emissions are an indirect effect of authorizing this project, which FERC could 
reasonably foresee, and which the agency has legal authority to mitigate.”292  The court 
recognized that the quantification was important because it “would permit the agency 
to compare the emissions from this project to emissions from other projects, to total 
emissions from the state or region, and to regional or national emission control 
goals.”293  That quantification provides an opportunity for informed public comment, 
as well as a meaningful assessment of mitigation measures.   
Arguments that it is too speculative to quantify anticipated downstream GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel production are losing credibility.  Most permitting processes 
include a reasonably foreseeable development scenario (RFDS) setting forth estimated 
well or mine production, which can be used to anticipate downstream emissions.294  
The RFDS is a “long-term projection of oil and gas exploration, development, 
 
States Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1229-30 (D. 
Colo. 2015) (downstream coal combustion is an indirect effect of mining plan) order vacated and 
appeal dismissed as moot by 652 Fed. Appx. 717 (10th Cir. 2016). 
292 867 F.3d at 1374. 
293 Id.   
294 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (holding 
that because FERC had already estimated how much gas the pipelines would transport, there was 
no reason why that number could not be used to estimate GHG emissions); Citizens for a Healthy 
Cmty v. United States BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo. 2019) (“Simply put, an agency 
cannot rely upon production estimates while simultaneously claiming that it would be too 
speculative to rely on the predicted emissions from those same production estimates.”); Wilderness 
Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1155-56 (“It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to 
use estimates of energy output for one portion of an EIS, but then state that it is too speculative to 
forecast effects based on those very outputs.”); High Country Conservation Advocates v. United 
States Forest Service, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1196 (D. Colo. 2014) (“The agency cannot—in the same 
EIS—provide detailed estimates of the amount of coal to be mined and simultaneously claim that it 
would be too speculative to estimate emissions from coal that ‘may or may not be produced’ from 
mines that ‘may or may not be developed.’  The two positions are nearly impossible to reconcile.”); 
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49635 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-35849 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) 
(“In light of the degree of foreseeability and specificity of information available to the agency while 
completing the EIS, NEPA requires BLM to consider in the EIS the environmental consequences of 
the downstream combustion of the coal, oil and gas resources potentially open to development under 
these RMPs.  Without such analysis, the EIS fails to ‘foster informed decisionmaking’ as required 
by NEPA” (emphasis and quotations in original)). 
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production and reclamation activity in a defined area for a specified time”295 and should 
be included in the NEPA analysis.296  The RFDS is important because it “serves as a 
baseline for identifying and quantifying direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of oil 
and gas activity.297   
The BLM cannot skirt its responsibility to consider upstream and downstream 
GHG emissions by claiming that if it rejects or limits fossil fuel development in one 
location, the minerals will simply be developed elsewhere.  The Tenth Circuit expressly 
rejected this argument and the BLM’s conclusion that expanding two coal mines to 
extend the life of the mines would have no consequential impact on carbon dioxide 
emissions.298  “This long logical leap presumes that either the reduced supply will have 
no impact on price, or that any increase in price will not make other forms of energy 
more attractive and decrease coal’s share of the energy mix, even slightly.”299  The 
court found that this assumption was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion 
because it “defeated NEPA’s purpose  . . . of informed decisionmaking and informed 
public comment.”300  Similarly, the Federal District Court in Montana recently rejected 
an argument that a coal mine expansion would not contribute an increase to GHG 
emissions because the coal would be developed elsewhere.  The court described the 
argument as “illogical,” noting that it put a “thumb on the scale by inflating the benefits 
of the action while minimizing the impacts,” which is the kind of inaccurate 
information that would defeat the purpose of a NEPA analysis.301  
Cases such as these demonstrate that existing law already imposes a duty on 
the BLM to quantify anticipated GHG emissions, including the downstream emissions, 
from every oil and gas well.  Existing case law also recognizes that the purpose of 
quantifying emissions is to provide a meaningful assessment of mitigation measures, 
including GHG emission mitigation, during the NEPA analysis.   
 
295 R Terms, “Reasonably Foreseeable Development Scenario (RFDS), 8 Williams & Meyers, Oil 
and Gas Law Scope (2019) (citing Deborah Reichman, 173 IBLA 149, 157 (2007). 
296 BLM Manual § 1601.06(a)(3). 
297 Id. 
298 See, e.g. WildEarth Guardians v. US BLM, 870 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2017) 
299 Id 
300 Id. at 1237. 
301 Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. United States Office of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098 (D. 
Mont. 2017). 
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D. Courts recognize that old data is inadequate data.  
Although agencies may tier their EISs to earlier documents in order to avoid 
repetitive discussions of the same issues,302 courts are recognizing that old data 
provided in outdated resource management plans or EISs does not satisfy NEPA if the 
data does not incorporate accurate climate trends.  When tiering to other NEPA 
documents, DOI regulations require the analysis to include a finding that the 
“conditions and environmental effects described in the broader NEPA document are 
still valid or address any exceptions.”303  In relation to climate change, this standard 
cannot be satisfied if the earlier document relies on outdated climate assumptions. 
In Western Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM, the court found that the 
BLM arbitrarily restricted the range of alternatives in a coal leasing analysis by relying 
on Resource Management Plans that were drafted in 1985 and 1996.  By cribbing its 
alternatives analysis, the BLM also failed to consider the impacts of climate change.304  
Although other BLM documents generically acknowledged climate change at a 
departmental level, the BLM did not update its coal leasing analysis to include climate 
change concerns or consider whether those concerns justified restricting new coal 
leases.305  The court found that the omission arbitrarily restricted the alternatives 
analysis and did not deserve deference.  “Without such consideration, the BLM could 
not make a reasoned choice as to whether foreclosing development on additional 
acreage would serve its multiple use mandate and would address concerns that may 
arise from the changing conditions . . . including climate change.”306   
Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries, the 
District of Oregon held that “relying on data that is too stale to carry the weight 
assigned to it may be arbitrary and capricious,” particularly where it restricts the 
 
302 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20(2019); § 1508.28; 43 C.F.R. § 46.140 (2019).  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 
43360, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.11 (discussing tiering). 
303 43 C.F.R. § 46.140 (2019) (“A NEPA document that tiers to another broader NEPA document 
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 must include a finding that the conditions and environmental 
effects described in the broader NEPA document are still valid or address any exceptions.”). 
304 Western Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM , Case No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 WL  
147570 *7 (D. Mont. 2018) (“The 1985 Miles City RMP and the 1996 Miles City RMP failed to 
consider the impacts of climate change.”). 
305 Id. at *9. 
306 Id. at *9. 
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alternatives analysis.307  In that case, the agency relied upon an EIS drafted in the 1990s 
that failed to incorporate recent climate science.308  Hearkening back to NEPA’s 
purpose, the court recognized that a thorough alternatives analysis “may be able to 
break through any logjam that simply maintains the precarious status quo.”309   
These court decisions have implications for the BLM.  The scenario addressed 
in Western Organization and National Wildlife Federation is not uncommon.  Many of 
BLM’s land use plans date to the 1980’s and 1990’s, and the majority of BLM’s 
existing plans do not take into account knowledge and obligations around climate 
change that have been available for more than a decade.310  New data regarding the 
effects, intensity, and urgency of global warming must be included in the BLM’s NEPA 
analyses, including permitting decisions.  A comprehensive assessment of climate-
related impacts may break the logjam to considering new and innovative management 
strategies for fulfilling FLPMA’s multiple use mandate.  The BLM cannot continue to 
rely on stale data to maintain the precarious status quo. 
V. The BLM Should Develop a Comprehensive GHG Mitigation Plan for Its 
Oil and Gas Permitting Decisions. 
In order to find a more appropriate balance between the risks of climate change 
and federal energy development, the BLM could incorporate a net zero mitigation 
requirement into its fossil fuel permitting decisions. This approach would allow 
continued energy development without ignoring climate change.  A net-zero 
requirement on all new development activity would be more consistent with the BLM’s 
responsibility of managing various resources “without permanent impairment of the 
 
307 National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Services 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 875 
(D. Or. 2016). 
308 Id. (noting that “significant developments in the scientific information relating to climate change 
and its effects . . . has improved such that the environmental impact statements prepared in the 1990s 
are neither current nor sufficient”). 
309 Id. at 876 (holding that the purpose of a comprehensive NEPA analysis is to “allow, even 
encourage, new and innovative solutions to be developed, discussed, and considered”) 
310 See e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Utah Planning and NEPA, Plans in Effect, 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/utah (last visited May 27, 
2020) (identifying plans within Utah that date to 1980 and fifteen plans that are more than twenty 
years old).  See also, Bureau of Land Management, New Mexico Planning and NEPA, Plans in 
Effect, https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/new-mexico 
(identifying plans in effect that date to 1986 and nine plans that are more than twenty years old). 
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productivity of the land and quality of the environment”311 because it would help 
achieve the emissions trajectory necessary to keep global warming below 1.5°C.  A 
net-zero requirement would also “prevent unnecessary or undue degradation” by 
avoiding an increase in GHG emissions that will exacerbate climate change and its 
effects on public lands.  Finally, a net-zero requirement would be more consistent with 
FLPMA’s multi-generational investment horizon.  It would also strike a more 
appropriate balance of resource uses to meet “the present and future needs of the 
American people”312   
The BLM could incorporate a net-zero requirement without waiting for 
Congress to make a legislative change.  The existing oil and gas leasing structure 
provides the BLM with ample authority to mitigate adverse effects at multiple stages 
of the exploration and production process.  The following discussion focuses on the oil 
and gas permitting process, the same principles could apply to other fossil fuel 
permitting decisions.  
A. The BLM Should Impose a Moratorium on Oil and Gas Leasing 
Until It Has a Comprehensive GHG Mitigation Plan. 
The BLM has authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas while it develops 
a comprehensive GHG mitigation policy as part of the land use planning process.313  A 
moratorium is simply a pause on leasing and permitting decisions that would allow the 
BLM to develop a comprehensive strategy that is responsive to the climate data 
currently being ignored.  The BLM’s authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas 
 
311 43 U.S.C. §1702(c). 
312 Id. (defining multiple use to include “management of the public lands and their various resource 
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs 
of the American people”). 
313 United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding moratorium on 
oil and gas leasing); John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELI 10631, 
10631-32 (July 2019) [hereinafter Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing]; Michael 
Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope 
of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118-119 (2017) [hereinafter Burger & Wentz, 
Downstream and Upstream GHG Emissions] (discussing statutory and precedential authority to 
impose moratoriums on coal and oil and gas leases). 
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leasing arises from its overarching duty, articulated in FLPMA, to manage multiple 
uses without permanently impairing resources under its care.314   
The argument that BLM lacks discretion to pause oil and gas lease sales 
elevates form over function and ignores the relevant facts.  The Mineral Leasing Act 
states, “All lands subject to disposition under this Act . . . may be leased by the 
Secretary.”315  The statute then articulates procedures for leasing lands.  Among other 
things, the procedures state that “lease sales shall be held for each State where eligible 
lands are available at least quarterly and more frequently if the Secretary of the Interior 
determines such sales are necessary.”316  Some people have argued that this 
requirement prohibits the BLM from imposing a moratorium on oil and gas leasing.317  
This argument focuses myopically on the phrase “shall be held quarterly” to the 
exclusion of context.  First, the Secretary has authority to determine which lands are 
“eligible” and that determination must be made consistent with the multiple use 
mandate.  The statute qualifies the requirement to hold quarterly lease sales with the 
predicate “where eligible lands are available,” suggesting that at some point and in 
some places, eligible lands may not be available.  Additionally, BLM’s permitting 
decisions under the Mineral Leasing Act are governed by its statutory duties under 
FLPMA, not the other way around.  FLPMA states explicitly, “In managing the public 
lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”318  Where holding quarterly 
sales may result in unnecessary or undue degradation by locking in decades of 
unmitigated GHG emissions based on outdated scientific assumptions, this provision 
grants BLM discretion to take a pause on the quarterly sales.   
Additionally, a moratorium is simply an adjustment to the pace and structure 
of development. The Mineral Leasing Act vests the BLM with discretion to manage 
 
314 Other provisions further emphasize this duty.  See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2018) (“In 
managing the public lands, the BLM shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”). 
315 43 U.S.C. § 226(a). 
316 43 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A). 
317 See, e.g., Western Energy Alliance v. Jewell, No. 1:16-CV-00912, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5574 
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2017) (holding that plaintiffs, Western Energy Alliance, had standing to claim that 
BLM had a statutory non-discretionary duty to hold quarterly lease sales when eligible lands were 
available).  
318 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
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the pace and structure of mineral leasing, including suspension of operations in the 
interest of conservation.319  The BLM has relied upon its discretion under FLPMA and 
the MLA to adjust the pace of oil and gas leasing in the past.320  Additionally, federal 
courts have recognized that the phrase “in the interest of conservation” used in the 
MLA includes the prevention of environmental harm.321  In a slightly different context, 
involving routes across public lands, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the BLM must 
have discretion to suspend operations in order to complete the necessary analysis for 
land use planning where there is a threat of degradation.  “Because the RMP revision 
process is much more time-consuming than enacting a temporary closure order, the 
BLM could not effectively respond to resource degradation only through the formal 
planning process.”322  The same is true with regards to fossil fuel development.  The 
pace and structure of the current leasing system allows for cumulatively significant 
increases in GHG emissions despite an urgent need to reduce national emissions in 
order to avoid widespread resource degradation. Every incremental increase in GHG 
emissions exacerbates the climate change.  Pausing oil and gas leasing in order to 
develop a comprehensive GHG mitigation strategy is within the BLM’s discretion and 
 
319 See 30 U.S.C. § 209 (“In the event the Secretary of the Interior, in the interest of conservation, 
shall direct or shall assent to the suspension of operations and production under any lease granted 
under the terms of this Act. . . .”; 43 C.F.R. § 3103.4-4(a) (“A suspension of all operations and 
production may be directed or consented to by the Authorized Officer only in the interest of 
conservation of natural resources.”); see also Burger & Wentz, Downstream and Upstream GHG 
Emissions supra note 362 at n. 26-27 (listing provisions in the Mineral Leasing Act that vest the 
BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure of oil and gas leasing); see also Leshy, 
Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing supra note 97 at 10631-32 (challenging Secretary 
Bernhardt’s suggestion that the BLM lacks authority to impose a moratorium by reviewing the 
discretionary language in 30 U.S.C. §226(a) combined with precedent upholding a moratorium and 
subsequent legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act). 
320 See Dep’t of Interior, IM 2016-143 Implementation of Greater Sage-Grouse Resource 
Management Plan Revisions or Amendments- Oil & Gas Leasing and Development Sequential 
Prioritization 7 n. 10 (Sept. 1, 2016). 
321 Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v. 
Babbit, 129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997). 
322 Utah Shared Access Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) (BLM closure 
of land to ORV use in order to avoid undue degradation during the land use planning process was 
not “de facto planning” that required an Environmental Assessment and was within BLM’s authority 
and responsibility under FLPMA). 
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will allow the BLM to fulfill its statutory mandate of multiple uses “without permanent 
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”323    
The BLM’s responsibility to inventory public resources in order to make 
informed and strategic land use decisions provides further justification for a 
moratorium.324  FLPMA recognized that “the national interest will be best realized if 
the public lands and their resources are periodically systematically inventoried and 
their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process.”325  
FLPMA imposed a mandatory obligation on the BLM to inventory public lands and 
their resources and other values.  This inventory “shall be kept current so as to reflect 
changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values.” 326  
Based on this inventory, the BLM must then “develop, maintain, and when appropriate, 
revise land use plans” directing the management of public lands.327 
Existing oil and gas lease statistics indicate that a pause is needed to update 
planning for oil and gas development.  The BLM maintains a website publishing 
statistical information relating to oil and gas leasing on federal lands.328  Reviewing the 
most recent statistics reveals two notable trends.  First, the BLM offers a supply of land 
available for oil and gas leasing that is significantly higher than the demand.  In 2018, 
the BLM offered 3,073 parcels (representing 12,836,231 acres) for lease.329  But the 
BLM only received bids for 1,336 parcels (representing 1,351,287 acres).330  This 
means that less than one half of the parcels (43%) and only 10 percent of the acreage 
 
323 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
324 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (“The Secretary shall prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an 
inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values. . . . This inventory shall be kept 
current so as to reflect changes in conditions and identify new and emerging resource and other 
values.”); see also Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order 3338 Discretionary Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016) (justifying 
a pause on the issuance of new federal coal leases to avoid “locking in for decades the future 
development of large quantities of coal under current rates and terms that the PEIS may ultimately 
determine to be less than optimal”). 
325 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) and z- 1711(a). 
326 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a).  
327 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a).  
328 BLM, Oil and Gas Statistics https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-
gas/oil-and-gas-statistics [hereinafter BLM Statistics Website].  
329 BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 15 (Oil and Gas Lease Sales, Fiscal Year 2018). 
330 Id.   
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put up for leasing received a bid.  In other words, the current supply of leasable land 
far outpaces demand.   
Additionally, many leases have not been brought into production.  In 2018, the 
total number of leases was 38,147 (representing 25,552,475 acres).331  In contrast, there 
were only 24,028 producing leases (representing 12,794,553 acres).332  This indicates 
that there are 14,119 leases across 12,757,922 acres (almost 20,000 square-miles, or 
more than Vermont and New Hampshire combined) that have been leased but not 
developed.  If each of these already-leased parcels were put into production, it would 
increase the number of producing leases by 37 percent.  Therefore, the existing store 
of oil and gas leases will already impose a potentially significant, but not-yet-analyzed 
increase in GHG emissions.  The significance of those emissions, and methods for 
mitigating those emissions should be analyzed before the BLM increases that supply 
even further.  In light of these facts, instituting a pause on lease sales is justified and 
consistent with the BLM’s duty avoid permanent impairment of resources and prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation.  
B. The BLM Should Use Its Statutory Mitigation Authority To 
Require GHG Mitigation for New Oil and Gas Development 
Activity. 
The BLM has broad authority under FLPMA, NEPA, and the Mineral Leasing 
Act (MLA) to identify and implement actions that mitigate adverse effects of a project, 
including oil and gas leasing activities.333  The BLM also has contractual authority 
under the Standard Mineral Lease Form to require oil and gas lessees to incorporate 
mitigation measures as a Condition of Approval for drilling operations.  The BLM 
could use these authorities to identify GHG emissions as an adverse impact and require 
operators to mitigate that impact by avoiding, minimizing, and offsetting GHG 
 
331 BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 1 (listing total number of leases) and Table 2 
(listing total acreage in effect). 
332 BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 5 (listing total number of producing leases) and 
Table 6 (listing total acreage of producing leases). 
333 See Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands, 
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 316-322 (2017) [hereinafter Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation] 
(discussing BLM’s statutory authority and duty to implement mitigation measures and 
characterizing it as “beyond question”). 
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emissions.  With this approach, the BLM could require that all new oil and gas 
development activity achieves net zero emissions.   
Mitigation authority under FLPMA stems from the BLM’s obligation to 
balance multiple resources, avoid permanent impairment, and the prevent unnecessary 
or undue degradation.334  This statutory mitigation authority infuses the BLM’s 
regulations, which authorize the BLM to set standards that avoid impairment of other 
resources.335   
In addition to FLPMA, NEPA’s plain statutory language and the BLM’s 
NEPA-related implementing regulations also impose a duty to consider alternatives 
that mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed action.336  DOI NEPA regulations require 
that every proposed action include an analysis of “any appropriate mitigation measures 
or best management practices that are considered.”337  The mitigation measures “can 
be analyzed either as elements of alternatives or in a separate discussion of 
mitigation.”338  Although NEPA is frequently characterized as a purely procedural 
statute, the process of disclosure creates an opportunity to determine whether 
reasonable mitigation measures have been overlooked.  Paired with the BLM’s duty to 
avoid permanent impairment of resources and the mandate to prevent unnecessary or 
undue degradation, the NEPA process could reveal circumstances where the BLM 
 
334 See supra Section III.A; see, e.g., Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 18, 2003) (“FLPMA, by its plain terms, vests the Secretary of the Interior with the authority—
indeed the obligation—to disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining operation because the 
operation, though necessary for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.”); Jessica 
Wilkinson et al., Solid Ground: Using Mitigation to Achieve Greater Predictability, Faster Project 
Approval and Better Conservation Outcomes, 49 E.L.R 10028, 10033-35 (Jan. 2019) (listing 
authorities). 
335 See Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation supra note 316 at 316-20; see generally Justin Pidot, 
Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands, 61 B.C.L. REV. 1046 (Mar. 2020) [hereinafter Pidot, 
Compensatory Mitigation] (articulating sources of BLM’s authority to require compensatory 
mitigation). 
336 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); see generally Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in Discretion: Substantive 
NEPA’s Significance, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2016) (arguing for a substantive interpretation of 
NEPA).  See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e) (requiring that 
EISs “[i]nclude appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or 
alternatives.”). 
337 43 C.F.R. § 46.130(a). 
338 Id. 
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failed to incorporate mitigation measures into the permitting process, contrary to its 
statutory duties under FLPMA.339  
Additionally, under the Mineral Leasing Act, the BLM has broad discretion to 
determine what lands may be leased for oil and gas development.340  That discretion 
encompasses authority to decide not to lease lands, as well as authority to define 
operational limitations on all leasing activities.341  Since at least 2008, the BLM has 
recognized that its authority to identify and implement mitigation measures (both 
onsite and offsite of mineral development leases) arises out of FLPMA and the 
authority to regulate public land uses.342   
Specific to onshore oil and gas leases, the BLM has regulatory authority under 
the MLA “to require that all operations be conducted in a manner which protects other 
natural resources and the environmental quality.”343  Emphasizing this authority, oil 
and gas leasing regulations also impose a duty on operators to comply with mitigation-
focused restrictions.  Operators must conduct “all operations in a manner . . . [that] 
protects other natural resources and environmental quality; which protects life and 
property.”344  Additionally, operators “shall conduct operations in a manner which 
protects the mineral resources, other natural resources, and environmental quality.”345  
 
339 Moreover, because the regulatory requirement to include mitigation and best management 
practices in the NEPA analysis arises out of the Department of Interior’s implementing regulations, 
it is unaffected by the proposed regulatory changes to the CEQ’s implementing regulations. 
340 30 U.S.C. § 226(a). 
341 John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELR 10631 (July 2019); see 
discussion infra at Section V. A & C. 
342 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Offsite Mitigation, Instruction Memorandum No. 2008-204 (Sept. 30, 
2008), Attachment 1-1 (“The BLM’s authority to address the mitigation of impacts on public lands 
associated with a use authorization issued by the BLM derives from the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA).  Additional authority can be found in the statutes governing specific 
uses of the public lands such as the Mineral Leasing Act.  The congressional declaration of policy 
for FLPMA states that ‘the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of 
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values. . . .” FLPMA § 102(A)(8).  In addition, the use, occupancy, and development 
of public lands must be regulated by the Secretary through easements, permits, leases, licenses, or 
other instruments.” FLPMA § 302(b)); Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation supra note 316 at 319-
320. 
343 43 C.F.R. § 3161.2 (2019). 
344 43 C.F.R. § 3162.1(a) (2019). 
345 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019). 
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These regulations are consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty under FLPMA that “in 
managing the public lands the [BLM] shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action 
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”346 
In addition to the statutory sources of authority listed above, the BLM also has 
contractual authority to impose mitigation measures on oil and gas lessees.  The plain 
language of the Standard Lease Form puts every lessee on notice that the right to drill 
for oil and gas on federal land is subject to the duty to minimize adverse impacts, even 
if those impacts are not contemplated at the time of the lease sale.347  Section 6 of the 
Lease, which addresses Conduct of Operations, states, “Lessee must conduct 
operations in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to 
cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or users.”348  
Lessees must also “take reasonable measures deemed necessary by the lessor to 
accomplish the intent of this section.”349  Those measures can be identified after the 
lease sale, when the applicant applies to drill.  “Prior to disturbing the surface of the 
leased lands,” the lessee must notify the lessor “to be apprised of procedures to be 
followed and modifications or reclamation measures that may be necessary.”350  
Finally, Section 6 also puts lessees on notice that operations may be restricted, or even 
ceased for environmental reasons.351  Thus, the plain language of the standard lease 
form notifies each lessee that in addition to any pre-existing stipulations, the BLM 
 
346 43 U.S.C. §1732(b). 
347 Form 3100-11 at 3, Sec. 6.  These contractual provisions are consistent with the BLM regulations. 
43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019) (“The operator shall conduct operations in a manner which protects 
. . . natural resources and environmental quality.”); see also id. § 3152.5-1(b) (“The operator shall 
exercise due care and diligence to assure that lease hold operations do not result in undue damage 
to surface or subsurface resources.”); 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (“A lessee shall have the right to use so 
much of the leased lands as is necessary to explore for, drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose 
of all the leased resource in a leasehold subject to: Stipulations attached to the lease; restrictions 
deriving from specific, nondiscretionary statutes; and such reasonable measures as may be required 
by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values, land uses or users 
not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed.”). 
348 Form 3100-11 at 3, Sec. 6. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. (notifying lessee that operations may be restricted or ceased if “threatened or endangered 
species, objects of historic or scientific interest, or substantial unanticipated environmental effects” 
are observed in the conduct of operations). 
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reserves contractual authority to impose additional mitigation and reclamation 
measures after the lease is signed and when the lessee applies to drill.  
In summary, the BLM has the statutory, regulatory, and contractual authority 
and obligation to regulate mineral leasing operations in a manner that protects 
environmental quality.  That authority includes the ability to impose mitigation 
measures as necessary to protect other asset values protected by the multiple use and 
sustained yield standard imposed by FLPMA.352   
C. Arguments that the BLM cannot impose compensatory mitigation 
measures are procedurally irregular, inconsistent with precedent, 
and contrary to the statutory duties imposed by FLPMA. 
Before delving into the BLM’s authority to impose a net zero standard in the 
context of oil and gas development, it is necessary to distinguish between legal 
authority and the BLM’s current policy.  This section first provides history regarding 
the BLM’s current stance rejecting compensatory mitigation, which is set forth in 
Instruction Memorandum (IM 2018-093) entitled Compensatory Mitigation.353   The 
second part of this section summarizes the legal arguments against the BLM’s current 
stance. 
 
352 See supra Section III. 
353 IM 2018-93 supra note 84.  This was later replaced by IM 2019-018 without substantive changes.  
For simplicity and consistency with other analytical discussions of the memo, this discussion uses 
the original title. 
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1. The History of the BLM’s Current Stance Rejecting 
Compensatory Mitigation in IM 2018-093. 
  The Trump Administration’s approach to climate change was to ignore it,354 
and the BLM embraced this policy.355  On March 28, 2017, Executive Order 13783, 
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, rescinded all executive orders 
related to climate change and instructed all agencies to “suspend, revise, or rescind” 
any action undertaken in compliance with the rescinded energy and climate-related 
presidential regulatory actions.356  In addition to revoking Presidential Actions, 
Executive Order 13783 also rescinded climate related reports including “The 
President’s Climate Action Plan” and the “Climate Action Strategy to Reduce Methane 
Emissions.”  The order provided no factual justification for the rescissions, no 
alternative climate related reports, and provided no replacement strategy for 
responding to climate change.  It simply reversed course and wished away climate 
change. 
In response to Executive Order 13783, the Department of Interior issued 
several Secretarial Orders, including Secretarial Order 3349, American Energy 
Independence, which instructed all departments to undertake a “Mitigation Policy 
Review” and a “Climate Change Policy Review” as well as a review of “Other 
 
354 See, e.g., Chris Baynes, Trump Administration Removes All Climate Change References from 
Government Websites The Independent (Thursday, July 25, 2019) (discussing report that analyzed 
more than 5,300 pages of 23 federal agencies and found a 25 percent reduction in usage of terms 
“climate change, “clean energy” and “adaptation.”); Eric Nost et al, The New Digital Landscape: 
How the Trump Administration Undermined Federal Web Infrastructures for Climate Information, 
Environmental Data Governance Initiative (July 2019) available at https://envirodatagov.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/New_Digital_Landscape_EDGI_July_2019.pdf.  See also Environmental 
Data & Governance Initiative, Website Monitoring (providing ongoing analysis and reports of 
changes to federal agency websites that restrict access to climate-related information).  
355 See Andrew Bergman, Gretchen Gehrke, Toly Rinbert, and Justin Schell, Removal of Climate 
Change Webpage from and Shift in Language on the Bureau of Land Management’s Website, 
Environmental Data & Governance Initiative Website Monitoring Report (Jan. 9, 2018) 
(documenting changes to BLM’s website that eliminate references to climate change) available at 
https://envirodatagov.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WM-CCR-21-DOI-BLM-Website-
180109.pdf. 
356 E.O. 13783, Energy Independence supra note 11. 
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Department Actions Impacting Energy Development.”357  The BLM responded with 
zeal.  The results were published in October, “Final Report: Review of the Department 
of the Interior Actions that Potentially Burden Domestic Energy,” which listed all of 
the climate-related actions that the BLM either intended to or had already reversed.358   
In addition to revoking and halting all climate-related programs, Secretarial 
Order 3349 also took aim at mitigation practices.  After revoking Secretarial Order 
3330, “Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the Department of the 
Interior,”359 it directed agencies to review all actions taken pursuant to that order for 
possible reconsideration, modification, or rescission.360  Next, Secretarial Order No. 
3360 rescinded BLM Manual Section 174- Mitigation (Dec. 22, 2016) and BLM 
Mitigation Handbook H-1794-1.361   
In response, the Deputy Director for Policy and Programs in the BLM (Brian 
Steed) issued a department wide Instruction Memorandum (IM 2018-093) entitled 
Compensatory Mitigation.362  IM 2018-093 took the highly unusual and unprecedented 
position that “the BLM must not require compensatory mitigation from public land 
users.”363  It juxtaposed this unusual interpretation with a statement that, “[i]n all 
 
357 U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order 3349 American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017) 
[hereinafter S.O. 3349 American Energy Independence]  
358 DOI, Report of Actions that Potentially Burden Energy supra note 84. 
359 Secretarial Order 3330 had been adopted to establish a department-wide mitigation strategy that 
ensured consistency, efficiency, and durability in mitigation practices.  One of the purposes of S.O. 
3330 was to facilitate the use of a landscape-scale approach to land use decisions and to “focus on 
mitigation efforts that improve the resilience of our Nation’s resources in the face of climate 
change.”  Secretarial Order 3330, Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the Department 
of the Interior, Sec. 1 (Oct. 31, 2013). 
360 S.O. 3349 supra note 301 at 2. 
361 Secretarial Order No. 3360 Rescinding Authorities Inconsistent with Secretary’s Order 3349, 
“American Energy Independence” (Dec. 22, 2017).  This order also rescinded two Departmental 
Manuals, including Part 523, Chapter 1: Climate Change Policy (Dec. 20, 2012); Part 600, Chapter 
6: Landscape-Scale Mitigation Policy (Oct. 23, 2015). 
362 IM 2018-93 supra note 84.  This was later replaced by IM 2019-018 without substantive changes.  
For simplicity and consistency with other analytical discussions of the memo, this discussion uses 
the original title. 
363 Id. at 1.  Ironically, the Background section of Secretarial Order 3360 discussed the role of 
compensatory mitigation in a positive light, even though IM 2018-093 decried it as unauthorized.  
“Implemented properly and appropriately, compensatory mitigation can be an appropriate tool used 
to reduce or offset impacts from specific actions. . . . The Department recognizes the appropriateness 
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instances, the BLM must refrain from authorizing any activity that causes unnecessary 
or undue degradation.”364  Notwithstanding this duty, the memo announced that any 
compensatory mitigation must be proposed by a project proponent and must be 
voluntary.  “To ensure compensatory mitigation is voluntary, the BLM must not 
explicitly or implicitly suggest that project approval is contingent upon proposing a 
‘voluntary’ compensatory mitigation component or that doing so would reverse or 
avoid an adverse finding.”365  The IM’s sparse legal analysis relied on Executive Order 
13783, Secretarial Order 3349, and Secretarial Order 3360 as justification.366  Without 
discussing the statutory language of FLPMA, the existing regulatory structure, or case 
law, the Instruction Memorandum took the unsupported position that “While FLPMA 
in some instances may be interpreted to authorize various forms of the mitigation 
hierarchy, such as avoidance and minimization, it cannot reasonably be read to allow 
BLM to require mandatory compensatory mitigation for potential temporary or 
permanent impacts from activities authorized on public lands.”367   
2. IM 2018-093 is not legally binding and does not deserve 
deference because it is contrary to precedent and the 
statutory language of FLPMA. 
The BLM’s retreat from mitigation has been harshly criticized, and rightfully 
so.  The inventive interpretations set forth in IM 2018-093 are not legally binding and 
do not deserve deference.368  First, the Department of the Interior has clearly stated that 
instruction memorandums “do not have the force and effect of law.”369  Second, IM 
 
of compensatory mitigation in certain instances and the role it serves in the legal use and 
management of public lands under the jurisdiction of the Department.” 
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 2. 
366 Id. at 3. 
367 Id. at 3. 
368 Pidot, The BLM’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy supra note 93 at 1, 18 (detailing the 
procedural irregularity of issuing such a sweeping change of legal interpretation through an 
instruction memorandum issued by an acting director, where a change in legal interpretation would 
normally be issued by the Solicitor in an M-Opinion). 
369 Robert S. Glenn & DeLoyd Cazier, 124 Interior Dec. 104, 109 (IBLA 1992) (noting that although 
agency employees are bound to follow agency manuals, “Instruction Memoranda and BLM Manual 
Provisions do not have the force and effect of law and are not binding on either this Board or the 
public at large.” (quoting Pamela S. Crocker-Davis, 94 IBLA 328, 332 (1986)); see McMaster v. 
United States, 731 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Robert S. Glen).  
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2018-093 cannot impose a “binding norm” because it was not adopted through notice 
and comment rulemaking.   Third, the legal interpretation set forth in IM 2018-093 
finds no support in the words or structure of FLPMA.  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must generally use notice 
and comment procedures to make a rule.370  Without following this procedure, 
statements of policy must leave officials “free to consider the individual facts of the 
various cases that arise.”371  Because IM 2018-093 was not adopted through the 
appropriate rulemaking procedures, it does not have the force of law and cannot restrict 
officials within the BLM from utilizing compensatory mitigation as a tool to achieve 
the multiple use balance. 
The interpretation provided in IM 2018-93 also ignores precedent and jettisons 
years of hard work.  Creative solutions to avoiding degradation have frequently been 
implemented by the BLM through compensatory mitigation.  For example, in 1988, to 
conserve the desert tortoise, the BLM adopted a “no net loss” standard to govern 
compensatory mitigation for activities within the habitat of an unlisted species.372  
More recently, compensatory mitigation measures were incorporated by the BLM in 
the Desert Renewables Energy Conservation Plan (guiding the development of 
alternative energy resources in California), and the BLM’s commitment to 
implementing compensatory mitigation measures to address impacts to the greater 
sage-grouse provided justification for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife’s decision not to “list” 
the greater sage-grouse as a threatened or endangered species.373  Each of these 
programs relied upon compensatory mitigation to achieve the BLM’s multiple use 
mandate. 
 
370 5 U.S.C. § 553; Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1233 (D. Mont. 
2018). 
371 Western Watersheds Project, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-1234 (quoting Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 
813 F. 2d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
372 See Bureau of Land Mgmt., Desert Tortoise Mgmt. Oversight Grp., Final Report: Compensation 
for the Desert Tortoise 1 (1991) https://tortoise.org/conservation/hastey1991.pdf 
373 See generally Bureau of Land Mgmt., Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan: Land Use 
Plan Amendment (2016) https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-
frontoffice/projects/lup/66459/133474/163144/DRECP_BLM_LUPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B7A-
3PJU]; See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List 
Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) as Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 59,858, 59,880 (Oct. 2, 2015).  
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Moreover, the rejection of compensatory mitigation finds no support in the 
words or the structure of FLPMA.  “The implausibility of Congress’s leaving a highly 
significant issue unaddressed . . . is assuredly one of the factors to be considered.”374  
If Congress had meant to preclude compensatory mitigation, it would have said so.  
Instead, Congress granted the BLM a vast and challenging task without imposing 
specific limitations on the tools that the BLM could use.375  Even the definition of 
multiple use grants broad leeway to the BLM to make “the most judicious use of the 
land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to 
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs 
and conditions.”376  Additionally, in the development and revision of land use plans, 
the BLM shall “consider the relative scarcity of the values involved and the availability 
of alternative means . . . and sites for realization of those values.”377  It is illogical that 
Congress would have assigned such a large task in such broad terms, with such wide 
authority, but then silently restricted the BLM from finding creative ways to strike the 
right balance by offsetting harms through compensatory mitigation.378  In other words, 
Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”379   
In summary, the BLM’s current policy rejecting compensatory mitigation lacks 
the force of law, jettisons decades of precedent, and contradicts a reasonable statutory 
interpretation.380  Because it represents a policy choice, not a legal boundary of the 
BLM’s authority, it should not detract from an informed discussion of the BLM’s legal 
authority to require mitigation of GHG emissions. 
 
374 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 547, 468-69 (2000) 
375 See, e.g. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(12), (8) (instructing the BLM to balance multiple uses that include 
recognition of “the Nation’s need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from 
public lands” with the responsibility to manage those lands “in a manner that will protect the quality 
of scientific, scenic, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values”). 
376 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
377 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(7). 
378 See Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation supra note 318 at 1088-1089 (noting that when Congress 
enacted FLPMA, compensatory mitigation was a familiar land use planning tool for municipal 
planners and that the term “land use planning” was a term of art with general usage that incorporated 
the body of learning from which it was taken).  
379 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 468. 
380 Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation supra note 318 at 1062.  See generally Pidot, The Bureau of 
Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, supra note 93. 
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VI. Ways to Incorporate GHG Mitigation at Each Stage of the Oil and Gas 
Development Process. 
Oil and gas leasing decisions occur in three stages: (1) land use planning; (2) 
leasing; and (3) Application to Drill (APD) approval.  Each stage triggers NEPA, and 
the BLM has authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts at each stage.381  By 
identifying GHG emissions as an adverse impact of oil and gas development, the BLM 
could use its existing regulatory authority to require that all new oil and gas 
development activity include a mitigation strategy for achieving net zero emissions.   
A. Land Use Planning:  New data regarding climate change provide 
changed circumstances that justify revising land use plans to 
include a net zero stipulation on all new oil and gas leases. 
Oil and gas development decisions begin with land use planning and 
preparation of a resource management plan (“RMP”).  Land use planning is an ongoing 
statutory duty imposed on the BLM through FLPMA.382  RMPs define allowable uses 
across a broad landscape that often exceeds a million acres or more, defining the 
desired future conditions for that landscape and the resources it contains.383  This 
includes identifying which areas will be open to future oil and gas leasing and the land 
use stipulations that will apply to those lands.  Creating and revising an RMP is a major 
federal action that requires a NEPA analysis, which includes consideration of climate 
change.384  The planning process (aided by NEPA) must “use and observe the principles 
of multiple use and sustained yield.”385 
 
381 See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmnt, 565 F.3d 683, 716 (10th Cir. 
2009); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Int., 377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).   
382 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). 
383 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).   
384 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6; 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5(a), (b). 
385 These principles include the obligation to “rely, to the extent that it is available, on the inventory 
of the public lands, their resources, and other values”; “use a systematic interdisciplinary approach”; 
“give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”; “weigh 
long term benefits to the public against short-term benefits;” “provide for compliance with 
applicable pollution control laws;” and coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and 
management activities with the programs of other Federal departments and agencies and states, 
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Congress anticipated that RMPs would, and should, change with the needs of 
future generations.386  When appropriate, BLM has a duty to revise land use plans.387  
BLM regulations state that RMPs “shall” be amended when new information, such as 
monitoring and evaluation findings, new data, or a change in circumstances becomes 
available.388   
The BLM has already acknowledged that these statutory principles impose a 
responsibility on the agency to consider climate change as it relates to mineral 
development.  Referring to coal, the BLM stated, “Consideration of the implications of 
Federal coal leasing for climate change, as an extensively documented threat to the 
health and welfare of the American people, falls squarely within the factors to be 
considered in determining the public interest.’”389 This statement is equally applicable 
to other fossil fuels, including oil and gas. The BLM also recognized that the 
information related to climate change “is critical in the development of land use plans 
where the Secretary must ‘weigh the long-term benefits to the public against short-term 
benefits.”390   
Since the BLM made those statements acknowledging the urgency of climate 
change, new reports have added additional urgency.  For example, the IPCC Special 
Report emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and myriad 
scientific studies associated with that report have been released.  With many BLM 
plans dating to the 1980s and 1990s,391 current climate science reports constitute new 
 
local, and tribal governments.  43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 624 F.3d at 1096-97; 
Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, supra note 185 at 429.  
386 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711(a) (the inventory upon which plans are based “shall be kept current so as to 
reflect changes in conditions”); and 1712(c)(4) (plans “shall . . . rely, to the extent it is available on 
the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values.”). 
387 43 USC § 1712(a) (BLM must “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate revise land plans.”); 
Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. BLM, 624 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010); SUWA, 542 U.S. at 58-60 
(describing the land use process). 
388 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5 (“An amendment shall be initiated by the need to consider monitoring and 
evaluating findings, new data, new or revised policy, a change in circumstances, or a proposed action 
that may result in a change in the scope of resource uses or a change in the terms, conditions, and 
decisions of the approved plan.”). 
389 BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at ES-2. 
390 Id.  
391 See e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Utah Planning and NEPA, Plans in Effect, 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/utah (last visited May 27, 
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data and a change in circumstances warranting a reassessment of land use decisions.392  
With this justification, the land use plan revision process could be used to update or 
implement generally applicable land use requirements and lease stipulations that better 
account for GHG emissions and climate change.393   
More specifically, the BLM could amend existing land use plans to adopt a 
stipulation that would apply to all new oil and gas leases.  Such a stipulation could 
impose GHG mitigation measures requiring that all new oil and gas leases achieve net 
zero emissions.  As the BLM recognized in the coal program Scoping Report, a net 
zero requirement could be achieved by requiring the lessee to carry out or fund 
activities that proportionally offset emissions.394  “This approach has been used under 
the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act as an efficient way to provide 
appropriate and measurable benefits to a resource that has been negatively affected 
through a proposed action.”395   
Potential methods of achieving net zero emissions are diverse.  As a small, 
illustrative example, the lessee could implement methane reduction strategies such as 
plugging abandoned and orphaned wells sufficient to offset the anticipated CO2e 
emissions quantified during the NEPA process.  So long as the methane reduction 
strategies implemented would not otherwise be required by law, the reduction in GHGs 
could be used to offset the emissions from the new well.  The potential GHG reductions 
that can be achieved by plugging abandoned and orphaned wells are significant.  The 
 
2020) (identifying plans in effect that date to 1980 and fifteen plans within Utah that are more than 
twenty years old).  See also, Bureau of Land Management, New Mexico Planning and NEPA, Plans 
in Effect, https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/new-mexico 
(identifying plans in effect that date to 1986 and nine plans that are more than twenty years old). 
392 43 U.S.C. §1712(c)(7). 
393 For example, in order to implement procedures that would protect the greater sage grouse, the 
BLM revised or amended 98 land management plans to adopt sage grouse protections across the 
bird’s range in ten Western states.  To ensure that the mitigation measures incorporated into the land 
use plans were implemented consistently, the BLM issued an Instructional Memorandum detailing 
implementation.  See Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhart, CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90571, *6-8 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020).  
394 BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 6-17 (“Alternatively, under 
this option, the BLM could approve transactions proposed by lessees that would achieve the desired 
outcome of compensatory mitigation, but for which projects were carried out by private businesses, 
non-profits, or state or local agencies.”). 
395 Id.  
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EPA estimates that methane emitted from abandoned oil and gas wells was responsible 
for 7 MMT of CO2e emissions, and that abandoned underground coal mines produced 
an additional 6.2 MMTs of CO2e emissions in 2018.396  These emissions provide no 
benefit to society, but still exacerbate climate change.  Leak reduction at unabandoned 
facilities may provide an additional opportunity.  Alternatively, a lessee could offset 
emissions through investment in carbon sink strategies verified by a third party.  Or a 
company could offset emissions by transitioning to an electric vehicle fleet.  Although 
there are still challenges to be worked out, a market already exists to utilize third party 
providers who verify and manage net zero commitments.397   
Individually revising every RMP to incorporate climate data would be 
painstakingly slow.  Fortunately, that is not necessary because NEPA provides a 
procedural mechanism for analyzing this type of programmatic change.  The most 
efficient way to implement a GHG mitigation strategy (applicable to all new oil and 
gas leasing decisions) would be to initiate a Programmatic EIS (“PEIS”) considering a 
nationwide strategy and identifying standardized, predictable ways of implementing 
and phasing in a net zero emission standard on all new oil and gas leasing.398  
Conducting a nationwide PEIS would enable the BLM to accurately assess the 
reasonably foreseeable impacts from oil and gas development combined with other 
fossil fuel development activities nationally and globally.  It would also allow the BLM 
to incorporate the most recent scientific observations regarding climate change, which 
indicate that every incremental increase in GHG emissions is significant in order to 
limit warming to 1.5°C.399  Moreover, a national PEIS is appropriate because climate 
change is a global problem. GHGs emitted regionally affect the whole nation equally.  
 
396 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fast Facts 1990-2018 National-Level U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/fastfacts-1990-
2018.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2020). 
397 See generally., Michael A Mehling, Governing Cooperative Approaches under the Paris 
Agreement, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 765 (2019). 
398 White House Council on Envtl. Quality, Effective Use of Programmatic NEPA Reviews 10 (2014) 
https://perma.cc/93PR-JTUJ (“A well-crafted programmatic NEPA review provides the basis for 
decisions to approve such broad or high-level decisions such as identifying geographically bounded 
areas within which future proposed activities can be taken or identifying broad mitigation and 
conservation measures that can be applied to subsequent tiered reviews.” 
399 Id. (“One advantage of preparing a programmatic NEPA review for repetitive agency activities 
is that the programmatic NEPA review can provide a starting point for analyzing direct, indirect, 
and cumulative impacts.”). 
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In summary, the BLM has authority to impose a net zero mitigation 
requirement on all new oil and gas development through its ongoing statutory duty to 
update land use plans where new data or changed circumstances justify revision.  The 
overwhelming scientific consensus regarding the urgency of reducing emissions 
constitutes changed circumstances that justify such a revision.  The BLM could 
advance the substantive goals contained in FLPMA through the NEPA process, 
programmatically evaluating options to achieve net zero emissions.  
B. Leasing: Even without amending RMP’s, the BLM can impose a 
net zero mitigation requirement as a stipulation attached to all new 
leases.  
The second stage of oil and gas development occurs when the BLM offers 
specific parcels of land for lease sale through a competitive or non-competitive bidding 
process.400  At the leasing stage, the BLM may include stipulations set forth in the RMP 
or attach new stipulations.401  The leasing process tiers to the applicable RMP while 
affording an opportunity to take a closer look at specific areas and likely developments. 
A closer look may be necessary because RMPs can cover millions of acres and lack 
the resolution required to address discrete resources in specific areas.   
Leasing decisions require a NEPA analysis because they represent an 
“irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.”402  Even if an RMP 
 
400 Bruce Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil 
and Gas Leasing Obligations, 40 Envtl. L. 599, 607-08 (Spring 2010) [hereinafter Pendery, BLM’s 
Retained Rights]. 
401 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-3 (“The authorized officer may require stipulations as conditions of lease 
issuance.  Stipulations shall become part of the lease and shall supersede inconsistent provisions of 
the standard lease form.”). 
402 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977)) (holding that issuing an oil and gas 
lease without a no surface occupancy stipulation represents an irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment of resources, which requires compliance with NEPA); See also Pendery, BLM’s 
Retained Rights supra note 401 at 609 and Part VII.D (discussing cases).  However, some courts 
have accepted agency arguments that the environmental impacts at this stage are too speculative for 
a NEPA analysis.  See, e.g., WildEarth v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Projects in 
their infancy have uncertain futures, and thus, it would be unreasonable to require BLM to consider 
every proposed lease from its analysis of foreseeable future actions.” (quoting Theodore Roosevelt 
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
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authorizes a particular land use, the site-specific NEPA analysis provides an 
opportunity to assess whether the assumptions supporting the RMP decision remain 
valid, and whether there are additional or new site-specific considerations that may 
have a significant effect on the environment.  The pre-leasing NEPA process may 
identify mitigation measures based on site-specific limitations or in response to 
monitoring and evaluation results that are part of an adaptive management strategy.403  
Mitigation measures developed during the pre-leasing NEPA process may be 
incorporated as lease stipulations and published prior to the lease sale.404  Because the 
lease is a contract, the BLM has broad authority to define the terms of the contract prior 
to sale.405   
Stipulations have been used in a wide variety of contexts to adjust the standard 
lease terms to avoid adverse effects related to energy development.  A 2008 study 
conducted under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act found that of the 128 Federal 
land use plans surveyed, there were approximately 3,125 individual stipulations in 
place.406  The study reported that the reviewed stipulations “serve many purposes, 
ranging from the protection of environmental, social, historical, or cultural resources 
or values to the payment of rentals and royalties.”407 
Rather than amending RMPs to require a net zero lease stipulation, the BLM 
could use its regulatory authority over mineral lease operations to impose a standard 
stipulation that would apply nationally to all new leases.  As discussed above, initiating 
a PEIS would provide an appropriate procedural mechanism for implementing this 
approach.  Alternatively, the BLM could impose stipulations on a lease-by-lease basis.  
While a lease-by-lease approach would increase flexibility, it would also increase the 
 
403 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (directing Interior Bureaus to use “adaptive management” as part of the NEPA 
process, especially “in circumstances where long-term impacts may be uncertain and future 
monitoring will be needed to make adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions.” 
404 43 U.S.C. § 3101.1-3 (“Any party submitting a bid . . . shall be deemed to have agreed to 
stipulations applicable to the specific parcel.”). 
405 Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights supra note 401 at 642; Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation 
supra note 316 at 319-321. 
406 U.S. Dept. of Interior et al., Inventory of Onshore Federal Oil and Natural Gas Resources and 
Restrictions to their Development (2008) available at 
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/EPCA_III_Inventory_Onshore_Federal_Oil_Gas.pdf 
[hereinafter BLM 2008 EPCA Inventory].  
407 Id. 
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burden posed by project-specific NEPA analyses, reduce certainty for oil and gas 
operators, and increase the risk of inconsistent stipulations between leases. 
C. APD Approval:  The BLM can require GHG mitigation through 
Conditions of Approval and Best Management Practices. 
At the third stage, the lessee submits an Application for a Permit to Drill 
(“APD”), which is a site-specific drilling and reclamation plan that the BLM must 
approve before operations can commence.  Consistent with the plain language of the 
standard lease form, the “Lessee must conduct operations in a manner that minimizes 
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other 
resources, and to other land uses or users.”408  As the Lessor, the BLM retains extensive 
authority to require that mitigation measures, best practices, and other “reasonable 
measures deemed necessary” be incorporated into the drilling plan as a Condition of 
Approval (“COA”) for the APD.409   
The BLM has used this authority to incorporate best practices and mitigation 
measures as part of the drilling plan, even if those practices were not anticipated at the 
time of the lease sale.410  For example, a 2008 study summarized: “Older leases issued 
before the effective date of the relevant plans may not be subject to stipulations from 
the current land use planning document.  It is reasonable, however, to consider the plan 
stipulations as applicable.  Environmental conditions that necessitate stipulations are 
often the driver for COAs that are attached to the drilling permits on older leases”411  
The BLM report goes on to explain that COAs enable the surface managing agency to 
achieve the necessary environmental protection, even at the APD stage,412 listing 
 
408 United States Dep’t. of Interior, Form 3100-11, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas 
(October 2008). 
409 Id. § 6; see also infra Section VI. C.  
410 Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA 144, 154 (2008) (upholding mitigation measures imposed as 
COAs that were more stringent than standards in the RMP); BLM Surface Operating Standards and 
Guidelines for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development: The Gold Book § 2.3 (4th ed. 2007) 
(“Constraints may result from lease stipulations, the surface management agency’s review and 
environmental analysis of the proposed operations, Notices to Lessees, Onshore Orders, or 
regulations.”). 
411 BLM 2008 EPCA Inventory supra note 351 at 12. 
412 Id. at 12. 
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multiple adverse effects that may be mitigated through COAs including air quality 
impacts, visual impacts, noise, and suburban encroachment.413   
A lessee challenging mitigation measures imposed as a COA at the APD stage 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that BLM’s opinion requiring the 
mitigation measures is erroneous.414  This standard affords the BLM considerable 
discretion to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage based on the best available 
scientific evidence.  For example, in Yates Petroleum, the lessee challenged mitigation 
measures that were more stringent than those set forth in the RMP, as well as the 
BLM’s decision to deny permits for five wells.415  In upholding the BLM’s decisions, 
the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) emphasized the BLM’s regulatory and 
statutory authority to minimize adverse impacts on other resource values.416  The court 
reminded Yates that “A lessee’s right to use the leased lands is subject to ‘such 
reasonable measures as may be required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse 
impacts to other resource values, land uses, or users not addressed in the lease 
stipulations at the time operations are proposed.’”417  Applying this standard, the Board 
gave deference to the BLM’s imposition of mitigation measures and denial of APDs as 
“reasonable measures required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts 
to a resource value not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations were 
 
413 Id.  
414 Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA 144, 154 (2008); see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 IBLA 300, 
307 (2000) (holding that a lessee challenging a remedial requirement imposed as a Condition of 
Approval at the plugging and abandonment stage must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that such a requirement is excessive.”) 
415 Id. 
416 Id. at 155 (“The Secretary has general statutory authority to condition post-lease approvals in 
accordance with section 17(g) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended by section 5102(g) 
of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 (FOOGLRA), 30 U.S.C. § 
226(g)(2000)(determine actions required ‘in the interest of conservation of the surface resources’), 
section 302(a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 
1732(a)(2000) (manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, in 
accordance with land use plans), and section 301(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)(2000) (“take 
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”). 
417 Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA at 155. (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 and citing 43 C.F.R. 
3162.5-1). 
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proposed.”418  The imposition of mitigation to address GHG emissions is equally 
reasonable and enforceable.   
Additionally, the IBLA requires the BLM to incorporate new science into 
mitigation measures on oil and gas leases even where the RMP has not yet been revised.  
For example, in Maycock, Powder River Basin Resource Council, Biodiversity 
Conservation Alliance, the IBLA set aside the approval of 82 APDs and remanded the 
decision to the BLM for reconsideration of scientific studies showing that the sage 
grouse mitigation measures identified in the RMP were “not as effective as BLM 
contemplated they would be.”419  Since the issuance of the RMP in 2001, scientific 
studies showed that assumptions made in the RMP, regarding sage grouse brooding 
behavior were inaccurate.420  Although the EA acknowledged the studies, the BLM 
relied upon the mitigation measures identified in the RMP instead of imposing more 
stringent mitigation measures consistent with the new science.421  The IBLA found that 
the BLM’s reliance on the default mitigation measures prescribed in the RMP and the 
Powder River Basin EIS was arbitrary and capricious.422  Additionally, the Board found 
no reason for the BLM to rely on the existing RMP and FEIS until further research 
could be accomplished.423  Declining to defer to the BLM’s discretion, the IBLA 
pointed out that there was no “difference of opinion among experts” where all the 
“more recent scientific studies uniformly indicate that the current measures are less 
effective than BLM believed they would be.”424  In a related case, the IBLA upheld the 
BLM’s authority to impose more stringent mitigation measures than identified in the 
RMP and the FEIS based on the results of the new research.425  The Maycock holding 
 
418 Id.; see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 IBLA at 307. 
419 Maycock, Powder River Basin Resource Council, Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, 177 IBLA 
1, 16, 28 (Mar. 16, 2009). 
420 Id. at 16-17. 
421 Id. at 17. 
422 Id. at 18 (“It is contradictory for the BLM to rely solely on those mitigation measures in issuing 
an EA and FONSI at the same time that it acknowledges the validity of more recent research that 
demonstrates that those mitigation measures are not as effective as originally anticipated.”). 
423 Id. at 19 (“Nor can BLM avoid the problem by purporting to rely on the 1985 Buffalo RMP and 
the 2003 PRB FEIS and ROD until further research can provide a more accurate answer regarding 
the appropriate distance between disruptive activities and sage grouse lek and nesting and brood-
rearing areas. . . .  BLM has not shown any ‘conflicting’ scientific research.”). 
424 Id. 
425 Yates Petroelum Corp., 176 IBLA 144 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
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is particularly relevant to climate change, where there is also no difference of opinion 
among experts.  All recent scientific studies uniformly indicate that increasing GHG 
emissions will exacerbate climate change and result in resource degradation 
unanticipated by most RMPs.  Accordingly, relying on existing RMPs to avoid the 
imposition of GHG mitigation measures at the APD stage is potentially arbitrary and 
capricious and contrary to the BLM’s statutory duty to prevent permanent impairment 
while balancing multiple uses.  Requiring existing lessees to mitigate their impacts to 
the atmosphere and climate therefore fits squarely within the BLM’s existing authority.   
1. Using NEPA at the APD stage to implement GHG 
mitigation requirements. 
The NEPA process, which is triggered at the APD stage, can provide a forum 
to identify and justify the reasonableness of mitigation measures as Conditions of 
Approval, and the opportunity afforded by NEPA should not be avoided.426  If the 
appropriate analysis has been done earlier, this final and most granular level of NEPA 
review is often handled through a Categorical Exclusion that tiers to the RMP and 
leasing analysis.427  If the earlier analysis avoided a meaningful assessment of GHG 
emissions and climate change impacts, further analysis may be required.  According to 
BLM regulations, “Before approving any Application for Permit to Drill . . . [the BLM] 
shall prepare an environmental record of review or an environmental assessment as 
appropriate.  These environmental documents will be used in determining whether or 
not an environmental impact statement is required and in determining any appropriate 
terms and conditions of approval of the submitted plan.”428  Moreover, under the DOI’s 
regulations, “any action that is normally categorically excluded must be evaluated to 
determine any of the extraordinary circumstances in section 46.215; if it does, further 
analysis and environmental documents must be prepared.”429  Among the twelve 
categories of defined extraordinary circumstances are actions that “have a direct 
relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 
environmental effects.”430  Thus, even though APD applications may be numerous, 
they still require a meaningful environmental assessment under BLM regulations.  
 
426 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019). 
427 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
428 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019). 
429 43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(1) (2019). 
430 43 C.F.R. § 46.215(f) (2019). 
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Where the tiered document lacks an updated climate change assessment, a lack of 
significant impact cannot be presumed.   
Both industry and BLM often cite the BLM’s regulatory authority to impose 
mitigation measures at the APD stage in order to avoid NEPA at the leasing stage.431  
Especially where a climate change analysis was deferred until the APD stage, it 
becomes necessary and appropriate to use the NEPA process at the APD stage to 
explore cumulative effects and require mitigation.  Otherwise, alternatives to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation caused by exacerbating climate change will have 
been foreclosed without discussion.  In a similar context, a federal court in Colorado 
rejected the BLM’s claim that it was “too late” to analyze and mitigate GHG emissions 
after having delayed a thorough NEPA analysis at an earlier stage of the leasing 
process.  “Under this reasoning, it could theoretically reward agencies for skirting 
NEPA requirements in prior stages of oil and gas development, which does not align 
with the informed decision-making goals of NEPA.”432   
In order to justify a deferred environmental analysis at the leasing stage, the 
BLM itself has argued that it is not “too late” to impose stringent mitigation 
requirement at the APD stage.433  For example, in a case before the Interior Board of 
Land Appeals, a homeowners association challenged the BLM’s FONSI associated 
with a lease sale.434  The homeowners argued that the BLM had not undertaken 
 
431 See e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 326 F. Supp. 
3d 1227 (D.N.M.  2018); see also Park County Res. Council Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 
609, 621-22 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that BLM was not required to address potential mitigation 
measures of lease stipulations at the leasing stage because “[i]n order to work the lease, the lessee 
must submit site-specific proposals to the Forest Service and BLM who can then modify those plans 
to address any number of environmental considerations” and “each action is subject to continuing 
review”) overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 
970, 972 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
432 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo 2019) (holding 
that because downstream emissions were not considered at the leasing stage, the “earliest possible 
time” mandated by NEPA required that they be considered at the MDP stage.  “Since it did not 
happen before, this stage of the development process would be the earliest possible time.”). 
433 See, e.g., Duna Vista Resorts, 187 IBLA 43 (2016) (arguing that it was appropriate to issue a 
FONSI at the leasing stage because the BLM had authority to mitigate all potential environmental 
effects by imposing COAs at the APD stage, including dictating which formation the lessee could 
drill into); see also BLM, EA for Sold Wyoming Leases supra note 66 at 26, 35. 
434 Duna Vista Resorts, 187 IBLA 43 (2016). 
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sufficient analysis to know whether it was safe to allow development of the oil and gas 
resources to proceed upon issuance of the lease.435  Specifically, the homeowners 
argued that the BLM had not sufficiently analyzed the risk of emitting hydrogen sulfide 
gas, which had been released from several nearby wells.436  The BLM took the position 
that it had ample authority to require mitigation at the APD stage, and that the reserved 
authority would be sufficient to offset any potentially significant environmental effects.  
The IBLA accepted the BLM’s argument that it appropriately deferred analysis of this 
issue based on BLM’s authority to mitigate the risk at the APD stage by precluding the 
lessees from recovering oil and gas from the problematic formation.  “Further, were 
BLM to determine that such effects were unacceptable, even given the imposition of 
appropriate mitigation measures, it could, at that time, preclude the recovery of any oil 
and gas from that formation.”437 In other words, the BLM itself argued that its authority 
to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage is adequate to allow imposition of new 
conditions sufficient to prevent environmental and public health injuries or even 
preclude development from a particular formation entirely.   
2. The BLM has already imposed smaller GHG mitigation 
measures at the APD stage, demonstrating its authority to 
require more meaningful mitigation at this stage. 
Existing practices demonstrate the BLM’s authority to require GHG mitigation 
at the APD stage.  BLM field offices have already imposed GHG mitigation through 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) or Conditions of Approval (COAs) at the APD 
stage.  For example, the Colorado State Office in 2013 published a document 
identifying BMPs related to emissions, including GHG emissions.438  The document 
described the “process and strategies the BLM will use when authorizing activities that 
have the potential to adversely impact air quality.”439  They began by recognizing that 
 
435 Id at 46. 
436 Id. at 50-51. 
437 Id. at 51. 
438 Colorado Bureau of Land Management, Comprehensive Air Resource Protection Protocol 
(CARPP) (September 2013). 
439 Id. at 3; see also COLORADO BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, COMPREHENSIVE AIR RESOURCE 
PROTECTION PROTOCOL (CARPP) 9 (September 2013) [hereinafter CARPP Standards] 
(“Appropriate emission reduction measures are best identified and required at the project 
authorization stage, when the temporal and spatial characteristics and technological specifications 
of the proposed action have been defined.  The project-specific information available at that stage 
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“The BLM has the authority and responsibility under [FLPMA] to manage public lands 
in a manner that will protect the quality of air and atmospheric values.”440  To 
accomplish this, “The BLM will request the proponent of an oil and gas development 
activity . . . to submit a comprehensive inventory of anticipated direct and indirect 
emissions . . . including fugitive emissions and greenhouse gas emissions.”441  Using 
this inventory, where the project’s emissions are potentially significant, the operator’s 
plans “shall include a detailed description of operator committed measures to reduce 
project related pollutant emissions, including greenhouse gases.”442   
The BLM recently reaffirmed its authority to mitigate GHG emissions at the 
APD stage in response to a remand from the federal district court for the District of 
Columbia.  In WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the court concluded that the “BLM failed 
to take a ‘hard look’ at GHG emissions” arising from 283 parcels sold in a Wyoming 
oil and gas lease sale.443  In response, the BLM conducted an EA “to comply with the 
court’s decision.”444  In the EA, the BLM took the position that “The sale of parcels 
and issuance of oil and gas leases is an administrative action, without direct impacts to 
surface resources such as habitat, and water resources.”445  The BLM asserted that it 
conducts additional documentation and technical analysis prior to issuing a permit for 
site-specific lease operations.446  In other words, the BLM explicitly identified the APD 
stage, rather than the lease stage, as the appropriate stage to impose GHG mitigation 
strategies.  Specific to mitigation of impacts from GHG emissions, the BLM 2019 
Wyoming Lease Sale EA identified four sources of authority (and effective 
 
allows for the development of an emissions inventory and impact analysis that can be used to 
identify effective mitigation options for predicted adverse impacts.”). 
440 Id.  
441 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
442 Id. at 9. 
443 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 85 (D.D.C. 2019). 
444 BLM, Supplemental Environmental Assessment for the May 2015 – August 2016 Sold and 
Issued Leases DOI-BLM-WY-0000-2019-0007-EA 7 (2019) https://bit.ly/2D9ZYQo. [hereinafter 
BLM, EA for Sold Wyoming Leases] (articulating the “purpose and need”). 
445 Id. at 26. 
446 Id. 
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mechanisms) to mitigate GHG emissions at the APD stage: (1) COAs; 447 (2) BMPs;448 
(3) applicant-committed measures; and (4) requirements incorporated into a state air 
quality permit.449   Each one of these avenues could be utilized on other projects.   
In summary, the BLM could impose a net zero requirement on existing leases 
at the APD stage.  Imposing this requirement would be consistent with scientific 
consensus and would fulfill the BLM’s duty to avoid permanent impairment of other 
resources.  The NEPA process can be used to provide further justification for the 
reasonableness of imposing a net zero requirement at the APD stage.  Moreover, it is 
not too late to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage, especially where the BLM 
and industry shortchanged the NEPA analysis at the leasing stage, promising to 
evaluate mitigation measures at the APD stage.  Finally, the BLM has already 
acknowledged its authority to impose GHG mitigation measures as BMPS or as COAs 
and it is not unreasonable to expand this practice to impose a standardized net zero 
requirement that is applicable to all new oil and gas wells.   
VII. Conclusion: Requiring That All New Oil and Gas Activity Achieves Net 
Zero GHG Emissions Is a Reasonable Operational Requirement and Net 
Zero Policies Have Precedent. 
Climate change is creating a “new normal” requiring a fundamental 
reassessment of risks and asset management.  Entrusted with managing roughly a 
quarter billion acres of land surface and the rich resources those lands contain—range, 
water, wildlife, timber, cultural resources, scenic and recreational resources, and more, 
the BLM sits at the crossroads of this transition.  Scientific consensus indicates that the 
climate has already warmed 1°C, resulting in observed ecological and systemic 
changes that caution against allowing warming to exceed 1.5°C.  The current emissions 
trajectory will exacerbate climate change, with forecasted warming of at least 3°C by 
 
447 Id. (“Aside from the protection measures required under the lease stipulations or measures that 
may be voluntarily committed to by a project proponent, additional measures may be required as 
conditions of approval (COAs) attached to BLM’s authorization . . . based on technical and site 
specific NEPA review.”). 
448 Id. at 35 (“In carrying out its responsibilities, BLM has developed BMPs designed to reduce 
emission from field production and operations.  Analysis and approval of future development of the 
lease parcels may include application of BMPs within BLM’s authority, as Conditions of Approval 
(COAs) to reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.”). 
449 Id. at 35 (explaining that additional GHG mitigation measures could be incorporated as 
“applicant-committed measures” or “added to necessary State of Wyoming air quality permits.”). 
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the end of the century.  Reversing this trend and limiting global warming to 1.5°C 
requires adhering to a carbon budget that will achieve a 45 percent decline in global 
anthropogenic emissions by 2030 and reach net zero no later than 2050.  At this late 
stage in the game, every incremental increase in GHG emissions has cumulatively 
significant environmental consequences.  
Avoiding the irreversible and catastrophic results of warming above 1.5°C 
requires immediate reductions in GHG emissions sufficient to achieve economy-wide 
net zero emissions by 2050.450  In response to this scientifically derived prescription, 
many countries and large corporations have already adopted a net zero target.  BP Oil’s 
CEO, Bernard Looney, declined to mince words.  “Let me be very clear today. . . . The 
world does have a carbon budget.  It’s finite and it’s running out fast, and we need a 
rapid transition to net-zero.”451  Other large emitters, like Duke Energy and Dominion 
Energy, are also pledging to become net zero by 2050.452  Amazon has taken a 
leadership role by pledging to be net zero by 2040, ten years in advance of the Paris 
Accords.453  Similarly, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis established 
a goal of reaching net zero economy-wide by 2050.454  Additionally, the Biden-Harris 
platform includes a commitment to “ensure the U.S. achieves a 100% clean energy 
economy and reaches net zero emissions no later than 2050.”455  Adopting a net zero 
mitigation standard for all new oil and gas development activity would be consistent 
with these trends. 
A net zero requirement would also fulfill the BLM’s responsibility to maximize 
coordination of its land use plans with management programs of other federal 
 
450 IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 14. 
451 Robert Perkins, BP Sets Target for ‘Net Zero’ Carbon Footprint by 2050 Platts Oilgram News 
Vol. 98; No. 31 (Feb. 13, 2020). 
452 Targeted News Service, Dominion Energy Sets New Goal of Net Zero Emissions by 2050 
(Richmond, VA Feb. 12, 2020) (Thomas F. Farrell, II, chairman, president and CEO said, “Our 
employees have always been problem-solvers in the work we do for our customers.  I am confident 
we can use this same mindset to help solve this challenge and leave the world a better place for 
future generations.”). 
453 Joanna G. Ramey, Jeff Bezos Details Amazon’s Net-Zero Carbon Emissions 2040 Goal Fortune 
(Sept. 19, 2019) available at https://fortune.com/2019/09/19/jeff-bezos-details-amazons-net-zero-
carbon-emissions-2040-goals-climate-change/ (last visited April 25, 2020). 
454 House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Climate Crisis Action Plan 3 (June 2020). 
455 See https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited August 17, 2020). 
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departments and agencies, and of the States and local governments.456  FLPMA 
requires that the BLM coordinate land use planning and management “with the land 
use planning and management activities . . . of the States and local governments within 
which the lands are located,” and that the BLM’s “[l]and use plans . . . shall be 
consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent . . . consistent with Federal 
law and the purposes of this act.” 457  The United States previously made a commitment, 
consistent with scientific consensus, to significantly reduce emissions.458  Despite the 
Trump Administration’s hostility to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change,459 several state and local municipalities have committed to uphold the 
United States’ commitments under the Paris Accord.460  Twenty-five states have joined 
the United States Climate Alliance, a bipartisan coalition of 25 governors committed 
to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.461  The Climate Alliance recognizes 
“that climate change presents a serious threat to the environment and our residents, 
communities, and economies.”462  Alliance members are committed to “pursuing 
aggressive climate action to make progress” toward the goals of the Paris 
Agreement.463  Among the Alliance members are states with significant fossil fuel 
 
456 43 U.S.C. § 1712(8), (9). 
457 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).  
458 The United States submitted a plan to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions by 26-28% below 
2005 levels by 2025, which would put the country on a trajectory to achieve emission reductions of 
80% or more by 2050. See The White House, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep 
Decarbonization (Nov. 2016); U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information, U.N. 




459 Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement New York Times (Nov. 
4, 2019). 
460 Julia Rosen, Cities, states and companies vow to meet U.S. Climate Goals without Trump. Can 
They? LA Times (Nov. 4, 2019) (“More than 400 city leaders have joined the Climate Mayors 
association and 25 states and territories have joined the U.S. Climate Alliance. Both organizations 
have vowed to uphold the country’s Paris pledge.”). 
461 See United States Climate Alliance, Alliance Principles 
http://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-principles (last visited July 12, 2020). 
462 Id.  
463 Id.  
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resources managed by the BLM, including Colorado, New Mexico, and Montana.464  
In addition to these States, 446 Mayors, representing 71 million Americans, have also 
committed to uphold the commitments and goals of the Paris Agreement.465  A net zero 
requirement for new development would be consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty 
to coordinate its land use decisions with these States’ commitments to address climate 
change.    
There is also substantial precedent for adopting a net zero policy, and for 
including offsetting mitigation as a tool to achieve net zero emissions.  For example, 
on November 3, 2015, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum directing 
federal agencies to develop mitigation policies that “establish a net benefit goal or, at 
a minimum, a no net loss goal for natural resources the agency manages that are 
important, scarce, or sensitive, or wherever doing so is consistent with agency mission 
and established natural resource objectives.”466  The Environmental Protection Agency 
created the Net Zero Initiative to assist communities and the military in achieving Net 
Zero goals in energy, waste, and water use.467  Through this initiative, the EPA has 
signed Memorandums of Understanding with the U.S. Army and the Department of 
Defense to advance the sustainability goals of achieving net zero energy, water, and 
waste in military installations.468  A net zero policy is also consistent with the BLM’s 
landscape-scale approach to mitigation and land use decisions and with policies 
adopted by the BLM’s sister agencies within the Department of the Interior.  For 
example, the Fish and Wildlife Service explicitly adopted a “no net loss” strategy in its 
 
464 See United States Climate Alliance, About Us http://www.usclimatealliance.org/about-us (listing 
the following States as Alliance members: Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin). 
465 Climate Mayors, Paris Climate Agreement http://climatemayors.org/actions/paris-climate-
agreement/ (publishing a Statement signed by 446 Mayors committing to increase efforts to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet the 1.5°C target). 
466 Presidential Memorandum: Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and 
Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 68743 (Nov. 3, 2015), withdrawn by E.O. 
13783 supra note 11. 
467 See https://www.epa.gov/water-research/promoting-sustainability-through-net-zero-strategies 
(providing the Mission Statement of EPA’s Net Zero Initiative) (site last visited August 17, 2020). 
468 EPA, Net Zero Fact Sheet, Promoting Sustainability and Resilience through Net Zero and Net 
Positive Technologies and Approaches (PDF) available at https://www.epa.gov/water-research/net-
zero-fact-sheet (last visited August 17, 2020). 
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definition of landscape-scale mitigation.469  A no net loss has been applied to wetlands, 
and that policy has remained in place for decades through multiple administrations, 
Republican and Democrat alike.470  Thus, net zero policies have been successfully 
incorporated into BLM policies and permitting decisions in the past.  Adopting a net 
zero requirement for all new oil and gas development activity would be consistent with 
scientific consensus regarding the urgency of climate change, and it would be in line 
with policies adopted by other federal agencies responding to the risks of climate 
change. 
Within the existing legal framework, the BLM has authority to achieve net zero 
emissions on all new oil and gas development activity, and it can do so by imposing 
mitigation requirements at each stage of the development process.  This approach 
would be consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty to manage federal lands according 
to a standard of care, with a multi-generation time horizon, and without permanent 
impairment of the nation’s ecological resources, including the atmosphere.  Continuing 
to ignore climate change in its permitting decisions puts almost every resource under 
the BLM’s care at risk and fails to recognize what Larry Fink cautioned investors: 
“Climate risk is investment risk.” 
 
 
469 81 Fed. Reg. 83440 (Nov. 21, 2016), withdrawn by 83 Fed. Reg. 36472 July 30, 2018 (adopting 
a mitigation strategy that mitigation policy that “provides a framework for applying a landscape- 
scale approach to achieve, through application of the mitigation hierarchy, a net gain in conservation 
outcomes, or at a minimum, no net loss of resources and their values, services, and functions 
resulting from proposed actions”) 
470 See Remarks on Signing the North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Dec. 13, 1989, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1989, 1699 (“In recognition of these functions and their 
significance to the CWA, the goal of no net loss of wetland area and function was introduced at a 
national wetland policy forum by the Conservation Foundation in 1988, endorsed by the federal 
administration in 1990, and supported since.”); see also National Wetland Mitigation Action Plan, 
Dec. 24, 2002 (adopted by G.W. Bush); See Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting 
America’s Waters, Feb. 14, 1998 (Clinton Administration pledged a net increase in wetlands); 104 
Stat. 4761,4784; Pub. L. No. 101-646, the “Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and 
Control Act of 1990” (Nov. 29, 1990) (included a no net loss of wetlands pledge); 104 Stat. 4604, 
4635; Pub. L. No. 101-640, the “Water Resources Development Act” (Nov. 28, 1990) (included a 
no net loss of wetlands pledge); Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) Clean Water Act Sections 
404(b)(1) Guidelines; Correction 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (March 12, 1990) (developed at presidential 
direction and including a no net loss of wetlands pledge). 
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